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1 Classicism
Many of the most central questions in philosophy, and beyond, are naturally under-
stood as questions of identity. For example, philosophers (and scientists) have asked
such questions as the following:
Is knowing something the same as believing it truly and justifiedly?
Is being morally right the same as maximizing utility?
Is being hot the same as having a high gradient of entropy with respect to
energy?
Once we start asking questions like these, we can formulate a range of further ques-
tions that seem initially much less gripping.
Is knowing something the same as knowing it and knowing it?
Is being morally right the same as being both morally right and either prof-
itable or not profitable?
Is being hot the same as being not not hot?
Once we admit the meaningfulness of the questions from the first list, it seems we
have all these questions left dangling. What is clear is that they need to be ap-
proached in some systematic way, rather than one at a time. Unlike the questions on
the first list, each of which raises distinctive issues proprietary to some subfield of
philosophy of science, it seems reasonable to seek a general framework for theoriz-
ing about identity that settles the questions on the second list in one fell swoop.
Themost straightforward such view isBooleanism, according towhich—intuitively
speaking—the propositions, properties and relations of any given type form aBoolean
algebra under the operations of conjunction, disjunction and negation. This implies
a positive answer to each of the questions on the second list.
Somemight think that Booleanism is obviously false, because of putative counter-
examples involving attitude reports. For example, Booleanism implies that to be rich
is to be either rich and either happy or famous, or rich and not happy, but one might
argue that this is false on the grounds that someone without much logical acumen
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couldwant to be rich but not want to be either rich and either happy or famous, or rich
and not happy. But any attempt to use judgments about propositional attitudes to ar-
gue against identities is fraught with difficulties, since one must somehow resist the
argument from the tempting premise that one could want to visit Hesperus without
wanting to visit Phosphorus to the false conclusion that Hesperus isn’t Phosphorus.
And once these kinds of objections are excluded, Booleanism has many attractions.
It is a strong theory which settles a wide range of questions that seem in need of
settling. It is also very simple (as we will see later when we consider some axio-
matizations of it), and thus provides a good explanation of the many cases where
substitution of Boolean equivalents is truth-preserving even under some non-truth-
functional operator (such as a counterfactual conditional). While its opponents have
pointed to putative counterexamples, they have struggled to provide a comparably
systematic and consistent theory which predicts the alleged counterexamples, as
opposed to merely accommodating them. Booleanism thus sets the bar for what a
simple and predictive theory addressing questions of higher-order identity should
look like. This makes the task of investigating views compatible with Booleanism
a particularly important component of the broader project of mapping out the space
of views concerning the grain of reality (see Fritz 2017, and the introduction to this
volume). n this paper, we will contribute to this project by formulating, defending,
and exploring an extremely natural strengthening of Booleanismwhichwe callClas-
sicism.1 Classicism goes beyond Booleanism by adding identities involving identity
and the quantifiers that are analogous to Booleanism’s characteristic principles con-
cerning conjunction, disjunction and negation.
Part 1 of this paper will bolster Classicism’s claim to naturalness by presenting a
range of different axiomatizations of Classicism. Part 2 will map out two directions
in which Classicism can be further strengthened. One direction, which we might
think of as the direction of coarseness, has as its endpoint the “Extensionalist” thesis
that coextensiveness suffices for identity. Although Extensionalism itself seems to
us to be subject to decisive counterexamples, there are several interesting principles
entailed by Extensionalism which look like attractive additions to Classicism. The
other, less familiar, direction is the direction of fineness, in which identities whose
truth value is left open by Classicism are settled negatively. The most extreme ver-
sion of this idea, which we call Maximalist Classicism, adds to Classicism all of
the distinctness claims in the language of quantifiers and truth-functional connect-
ives that are compatible with Classicism. This view strikes us as an attractively
strong and non-arbitrary, in a domain where the avoidance of arbitrariness seems
1We choose the name ‘Classicism’ as it stands to classical (higher-order) logic as Booleanism
stands to Boolean propositional logic. It’s the same system asHE+Modalized Functionality in Bacon
2018a. It is also related to the intuitionistic system of higher-ordermodal logic fromAwodey, Kishida
and Kotzsch 2014.
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particularly urgent. Part 3 develops a model theory which is sound and complete
for Classicism, heuristically helpful, and can be used to establish the consistency of
many of the theoretical packages we discuss including Maximalist Classicism.
Even committed opponents of Booleanism will have something to learn from
this investigation. Many such theorists will be either be able to define, or be willing
to take as primitive, a connective expressing some notion of “logical equivalence”—
some relation less demanding than identity butmore demanding that coextensivenes,
obeying the analogues of the Boolean identities. If so, they will be able to find an un-
intended interpretation of our formalism under which they will accept Booleanism,
and will be able to raise the question of whether they should also accept Classicism,
and the various further strengthenings we will consider, under the same unintended
interpretation.2 For example, in the theories of Goodman (n.d.) and Dorr (2016), the
role of logical equivalence can be played by the relation of being two propositions
whose disjunction is identical to their conjunction. Likewise, in the object-language
theory suggested by certain versions of truthmaker semantics (Fine 2017a), one can
define a notion of “classical equivalence” which might play a similar role.3 And of
course, anyone who canmake sense of metaphysical necessity has the option of rein-
terpreting all our uses of identity connectives in terms of necessary coextensiveness.
Under this reinterpretation, some of the views we will consider may seem unfamil-
iar, or even wild. Any view fine-grained enough to distinguish some false identity
proposition from some contradiction will correspond, under the reinterpretation, to
a view on which certain metaphysically contingent propositions are possibly neces-
sary. This is ruled out by the most widely accepted logic for metaphysical necessity.
But the reasons for the orthodoxy of this logic seems to rest more on a dubiously
literal-minded attitude to the possible worlds model theory than on any argument.4
So we think that even under this interpretation, both Classicism and its logical max-
imalist extension are worthy views with much to recommend them.
2The unintended interpretation can be specified by defining, for each type, a notion of hereditary
logical equivalence: intuitively, two items are hereditarily logically equivalent when they produce
hereditarily logically equivalent results when applied to hereditarily logically equivalent arguments.
We can then reinterpret ‘=’ as ‘hereditarily logically equivalent’, and reinterpret all quantifiers as
restricted to entities that are hereditarily logically equivalent to themselves. (For a formally analogous
definition of hereditary coextensiveness, see Gandy 1956 and Dorr 2016, n. 106.)
3p is classically equivalent to q iff (p ∧⊤) ∨⊥ = (q ∧⊤) ∨⊥, on a certain definition of ⊤ and ⊥.
Thanks to Ethan Russo for showing that this works.
4For discussion of some more interesting arguments, see Williamson 1996, Bacon 2018a, §5.2–
5.4, and Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., §4.2 and §8.3.
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1.1 Background higher order logic
We will be theorizing in a higher-order language in which the syntactic role of any
given expression, or “term”, is captured by assigning it a unique “type”. (We take
both terms and types to be strings of symbols.) In general, our type systemwill beR,
defined to be the smallest set that includes the letter ‘e’ (the “type of individuals”)
and ‘t’ (the “type of propositions”), and is such that whenever  and  are in it
and  is distinct from e, ⌜( → )⌝ (the type of operations that make type- things
out of type- things) is in it. We call types distinct from e “relational” types. In
writing types we omit parentheses associating to the right, e.g. writing e → e→ t
for (e → (e→ t)). Terms of type e are called singular terms. Terms of type t are
called formulae; when they don’t have any free variables, they are called sentences.
Terms of any other type are called predicates.
We will also sometimes consider languages using the larger type system F ,
which is the smallest set containing ‘e’ and ‘t’ and containing ( → ) whenever it
contains  and , even when  is e: F thus contains types like e→ e and (e→ e)→ t
which are not in R.
Terms can be simple or complex. Simple terms come in two varieties, namely
variables and constants. Each variable and constant has a fixed type, and there are
infinitely many variables with each type (which we indicative with a superscript
when it is not clear from the context). Complex terms can be formed in two ways.
First: when A is a term of type → , and B is a term of type , (AB) is a term of
type . Second: when v is a variable of type , and A is a term of type , (v.A) is
a term of type  → . In writing terms, parentheses can be omitted associating to
the left, and the parentheses around lambda terms include as much as possible; thus
x.ABC abbreviates (x.((AB)C)).
The languages we are interested in will all include some logical constants, in-
cluding truth-functional operators and quantifiers. The question which to treat as
primitive and which as defined is relatively unimportant for our purposes: there is
a version of Classicism for each sufficiently rich choice of primitives.5 But for con-
creteness, we will focus on signatures that contain the following logical constants:
• Truth functional connectives ∧, ∨ of type t→ t→ t, and ¬ of type t→ t.
• For each type , quantifiers ∀ and ∃ of type (→ t)→ t.
5This is not to say that there might not be any dialectical significance to a given choice of prim-
itives. Someone might, for instance, accept the version of Classicism stated in terms of ∧ and ¬, but
reject the version of Classicism stated in terms of ¬ and ∨, on account of a having a non-Boolean
theory of disjunction. By contrast Classicism, when formulated with a submaximal basis of logical
constants, should be understood as taking the other connectives to be defined out of the primitive
logical operations in the usual manner.
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¬t ≔ ¬ ¬→ = X→ .z .¬Xz
∧t ≔ ∧ ∧→ ≔ X→Y →z .Xz ∧ Y z
∨t ≔ ∨ ∨→ ≔ X→Y →z .Xz ∨ Y z
∀,t ≔ ∀ ∀,→ ≔ X→(→)y.∀,(z .Xzy)
∃,t ≔ ∃ ∃,→ ≔ X→(→)y.∃,(z .Xzy)
→ ≔ pq.¬p ∨ q ↔ ≔ pq.(¬p ∨ q) ∧ (¬q ∨ p)
□ ≔ p.p =t p ∨ ¬p ≤ ≔ XY  .Y = X ∨ Y
Figure 1. Metalinguistic abbreviations
• For each type , an identity predicate = of type  → → t.
We write A∧B instead of ((∧A)B), and similarly for other terms of types  →  →
. When P is a formula and v is a variable of type , ∀v P abbreviates (∀(v.A)).Other abbreviations are listed in Figure 1: we put type subscripts on logical constants
to lift them to properties and relations (e.g. ¬e→tWise for ‘not wise’). → and↔ arethe material biconditional and biconditional; the significance of □ and ≤ will be
discussed later.
When providing English glosses on sentences in this formal language, we will
make free use of words like ‘individual’, ‘property’, ‘relation’, and ‘proposition’.
For example we will gloss ∀Z.Zx → Zy as ‘y has every property that x has’.
This practice should not be taken as providing our official translation manual from
the higher-order language into English. Rather, like Prior (1971) and Williamson
(2003), our attitude is that the higher-order language can be made intelligible in
a way that doesn’t rely on that particular translation into English, and is perhaps
independent of any translation into English.
A theory (in a given higher order language) is just a set of formulae. For ease
of axiomatization, we work with theories whose members include open formulae as
well as sentences. But it is only sentences that can be said in a non-artificial sense
to be true or false; and we can call a theory true just in case every sentence in it is
true.
All the theories we will be considering are extensions of a fairly weak version
of higher-order classical logic that we call H. An axiomatization of H is given in
Figure 2. The axiomatization consists of principles governing the truth-functional
connectives (propositional logic), principles governing the quantifiers at each type
(obtained by generalizing standard axiomatizations of first-order logic), and prin-
ciples governing the behaviour of . (In the latter, Φ[A] stands for any formula
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containing an occurrence of a term A, possibly with free variables bound by Φ, and
Φ[B] is the result of replacing this occurrence with the term B.) Note that in the
statement of the rules and axiom-schemes, the symbol ‘⊢’ just means ‘is a member
of the theory in question’, so that Figure 2 is a list of ten properties of theories.6 Any
theory having these ten properties we call a H-theory. All the theories we will be
considering later on will be H-theories, which means that they not only contain H
but are also closed under MP, Gen, and Inst.7
Against the background of H, our rather large set of logical constants could be
shrunk in various ways. The theorems of H that don’t contain ∃ can be axiomatized
by just closing all the ∃-free instances of the axioms (none of which are instances
of EG) under MP and Gen; similarly for ∀, closing under MP and Inst. We can drop
= and all the axioms involving it without affecting the set of =-free theorems. We
can drop ∧ so long as we replace the instances of  and  with versions involving
a variant of ↔ defined just in terms of ¬ and ∨. And we can drop ∨ so long as
we do something similar, and close now not under MP (which is trivial) but under
conjunctive syllogism: if ⊢ ¬(P ∧Q) and ⊢ P then ⊢ ¬Q.
One noteworthy theorem of H is
Existence ∃x.x = x
This is a schema, since x may be a variable of any type. Informally: Existence
says that there is something of every type. It follows (by PC and MP) from the Ref-
instance y = y, the -instance (x.x = x)y ↔ y = y, and the EG-instance (x.x =
x)y → ∃x.x = x. The fact that H implies Existence is not much of an objection to
its truth, since instances of Existence are not very controversial (only nihilists would
deny them). Nevertheless, it is worth knowing that there is a natural, mild weakening
H− of H that avoids having all instances of Existence as a theorem by restricting
when we are allowed to use open formulae in the derivation of a closed theorem.8
6It is worth noting a few other ways of axiomatizing H or any other H-theory. First of all, PC
could be replaced with any of the well-known collection of axiom-schemas whose closure under MP
yields PC. Second, EG and Inst could both be dropped in favour of the axiom schema ∃v(P ) ↔
¬∀v(¬P ), or alternatively UI and Gen could both be dropped in favour of ∀v(P )↔ ¬∃v(¬P ). Third,
we could divide the work of Gen (the “Hilbert-Ackermann Generalization Rule”) between a simpler
generalization rule (if ⊢ P , then ⊢ ∀v.P ) and a new axiom scheme ⊢ (∀v.P → Q) → (P → ∀v.Q),
where v is not free in P ; similarly for EG and Inst.
7H is not the only candidate for the label ‘classical higher-order logic’: one might also use that
label for the weaker logic H0 which eliminates the  schema and replaces  with the much weaker
“Extensional ” schema whose instances are just formulae of the form (v⃗.P )A⃗ ↔ P [v⃗ ↦ A⃗]. For
more discussion of H0 see Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., ch. 1 and Bacon and Zeng 2021;for a philosophical defence of the  axiom see Dorr 2016, §5.
8We define H− in terms of a family of theories H−V , where V is a set of variables. These are
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PC: ⊢ P whenever P is a tautology (substitution instance of a theorem of
classical propositional logic).
UI: ⊢ ∀F → FA (where A is of some type  and F is a term of type → t).
EG: ⊢ FA→ ∃F (where A is of some type  and F is a term of type → t).
Ref: ⊢ A = A
LL: ⊢ (A = B)→ (FA → FB)
: ⊢ Φ[(v.A)B]↔ Φ[A[v↦ B]], where A[v↦ B] is the result of replacing
every free occurrence of v inAwithB (so long as this can be donewithout
any free variable in B becoming bound).
: ⊢ Φ[v.(Fv)]↔ Φ[F ], where v is not free in F .
MP: If ⊢ P and ⊢ P → Q, then ⊢ Q.
Gen: If ⊢ P → Q, and v does not occur free in P , ⊢ P → ∀vQ.
Inst: If ⊢ P → Q, and v is does not occur free in Q, ⊢ ∃v P → Q.
Figure 2. Axiomatization of H
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However, the only type for which this weaker logic H− fails to prove Existence is
e. In every R-type other than e, we can construct a closed term using only logical
constants, and derive Existence using EG from the Ref-instance involving that term,
so that the new limits on the use of free variables are not relevant. Moreover, if we
add ∃xe.x = x to H− and close under MP, we get back H.9
1.2 Booleanism
According to the ‘Booleanist’ worldview it is possible to substitute Boolean equival-
ents salve veritate (see, for instance, Bacon 2018a.) We will thus take Booleanism
to be the result of adding the following schema to H and closing under its rules:
Tautological Substitution Φ[P ]→ Φ[Q], where P andQ are equivalent in pro-
positional logic, andΦ[P ] andΦ[Q] are formulae the differ by the replace-
ment of an occurrence of P with one of Q.10
Alternatively (following Dorr 2016, §7), we can define Booleanism to be the smal-
lest H-theory containing all instances of the following schema:
Tautological Equivalence (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q), whenever P and Q are equivalent
in propositional logic.
Here, v⃗ is short for v1.… .vn., for some n variables v1,… , vn with n ≥ 0. Everyinstance of Tautological Equivalence can be derived from the instance (v⃗.P ) =
(v⃗.P ) → (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q) of Tautological Substitution together with the Ref-
instance (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.P ). Conversely, any instance of Tautological Substitution
defined inductively as follows:
(i) H−V contains all instances of PC, UI, EG, Ref, LL, , and  with free variables in V .
(ii) Whenever H−V contains both P → Q and P , it contains Q.
(iii) Whenever H−V contains P → Q, H−V −{v} contains P → (∀v.Q) if v is not free in P , andcontains (∃v.P )→ Q if v is not free in Q.
A formula P belongs to H− just in case it belongs to H−V , where V is the set of variables free in P .The formula ∃xe.x = x is in H−V for every nonempty V , but it is not in ℎ(∅) and hence not in H−.9In type system F , there are other types besides e—for example, t → e and (e → e) → e—in
which there are no closed terms without nonlogical constants. The F -version of H− also fails to
prove the instances of Existence for these types. However, adding the single instance ∃xe.x = xwill
also make those instances provable.
10This replacement may occur even in the scope of -terms and may involve variable capture:
e.g., an instance is (p.p) = (p.p) → (p.p) = (p.¬¬p), which implies that double negation is the
identity operation on type t.
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(pq.p ∧ q) = (pq.q ∧ p)Commutativity-∧
(pq.p ∨ q) = (pq.q ∨ p)Commutativity-∨
(pqr.p ∧ (q ∨ r)) = (pqr.(p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r))Distributivity-∧∨
(pqr.p ∨ (q ∧ r)) = (pqr.(p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r))Distributivity-∨∧
(pq.p ∧ (q ∨ ¬q)) = (pq.p)Dissolution-∧∨
(pq.p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q)) = (pq.p)Dissolution-∨∧
Figure 3. The Boolean Identities
can be derived from Tautological Equivalence using Beta and LL to to extract the
formulae to be substituted.11
Tautological Equivalence is an axiom-schema with infinitely many instances. It
is not a trivial matter to tell whether a given formula is an instance (though it is a
decidable question, by the decidability theorem for classical propositional logic).
But we can equally well characterize Booleanism as the smallest H-theory contain-
ing the six individual axioms listed in Figure 3, the “Boolean Identities”. Many
other similar lists of axioms could be given, corresponding to different equivalent
definitions of Boolean algebras in mathematics.
One noteworthy consequence of Booleanism is that conjunction and disjunction
are “interdefinable”, in the sense that both of the following identities are true:
(∧) = (pq.¬((¬p) ∨ (¬q)))∧-duality
(∨) = (pq.¬((¬p) ∧ (¬q)))∨-duality
Given the truth of these identities, there is a good sense in which nothing would
have been lost if we had worked in the smaller signature containing only one of ∧
and ∨, treating the other when convenient as a metalinguistic abbreviation.12
11Let v⃗ be the variables free in either of P or Q. Then ⊢ (X.Φ[Xv⃗])(v⃗.P ) →
(X.Φ[Xv⃗])(v⃗.Q) by Tautological Equivalence, Ref, and LL. But the two sides of this conditional
are -equivalent respectively to Φ[P ] and Φ[Q], so ⊢ Φ[P ]→ Φ[Q].
12For any sentence P we accept involving one of the logical constants, ∧-def and ∨-def let us find
a sentence P ′ not involving that constant such that Booleanism implies P = P ′, and thus that the
fact we express using P can also be expressed by P ′. But ∧-def and ∨-def are controversial. Their
conjunction has some consequences that contain only one of ∨ and ∧ and are not theorems of H, so
while we are free if we please to treat one of the symbols as a metalinguistic abbreviation in such
a way as to make one of them uncontroversial, the truth of the other one will then be non-obvious.
In a setting where the truth of Booleanism is up for debate, it is thus helpful to work in a signature
containing both connectives, even if one in fact accepts Booleanism and hence ∧-def and ∨-def.
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Booleanism implies that every relational type  forms a Boolean algebra with re-
spect to the lifted operations ¬ , ∧ , and ∨ . There are weaker versions of ‘Boolean-ism’ which only requires propositions to form a Boolean algebra under conjunction,
disjunction, and negation, and has nothing to say about properties and relations. This
theory—let’s call it Propositional Booleanism—is the smallest H-theory containing
all instances of
Propositional Tautological Equivalence Q = Q′, whenever Q ↔ Q′ is a tau-
tology.
Propositional Booleanism can also be characterized as the smallest H-theory con-
taining each of the following formulae (or their universal closures):
p ∧ q = q ∧ p p ∨ q = q ∨ p
p ∧ (q ∨ r) = (p ∧ q) ∨ (p ∧ r) p ∨ (q ∧ r) = (p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ r)
p ∧ (q ∨ ¬q) = p p ∨ (q ∧ ¬q) = p
However, it is hard to imagine why anyone would want to endorse Propositional
Booleanism but not Booleanism. All the reasons we are aware of for liking or for
not liking the claim that propositions form a Boolean algebra seem to carry over
with exactly the same strength to every predicate type.13
1.3 Classicism
Although the axioms of Booleanism are very natural, they also seem like a somewhat
arbitrary fragment of a more general picture. They tell us a lot about the interaction
of the truth-functional connectives with identity, but are silent about the interac-
tion of the other logical constants—the quantifiers and identity—with identity. For
example, while Booleanism implies the identity of any two instances of the law of
excluded middle (p∨¬p = q∨¬q) it does not imply the identity of any two instances
of the law of identity (Ref: (x = x) = (y = y)). Likewise, while Booleanism implies
that conjunction is the dual of disjunction, it does not imply that universal quantific-
ation is (in the parallel sense) dual to existential quantification. But there are deep
connections between the logic of truth functional operations and the logic of identity
and quantification: it is hard to conceive of a motivation for a view that accepts the
former identities but not the latter ones.
The natural extension of Booleanism to the remaining logical constants is not
hard to identify. It’s just a matter of generalizing Tautological Substitution or Tau-
tological Equivalence to give the classical logic of higher-order quantification and
13Booleanism can be derived from Propositional Booleanism using the Functionality principle
discussed in §1.4 below.
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identity the same status that these schemas give classical propositional logic. And
the obvious thing to mean by “the classical logic of higher-order quantification and
identity” is the theory H introduced in the previous section. So we are led to the fol-
lowing generalizations of Tautological Substitution and Tautological Equivalence:
Logical Substitution Φ[P ]→ Φ[Q], whenever P andQ are equivalent in H and
Φ[Q] results from Φ[P ] by replacing an occurrence of P with one of Q.
Logical Equivalence (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q), whenever P and Q are equivalent in H.
These are interderivable for the same reason as Tautological Substitution and Tau-
tological Equivalence. We will dub the smallest H-theory containing all instances
of these schemas ‘Classicism’, or C for short.14
Unlike the other schemas we have considered so far, Logical Substitution and
Logical Equivalence are not decidable. But there are also natural decidable axio-
matizations of Classicism. By contrast with Booleanism, there is no hope of char-
acterization Classicism as the smallest H-theory containing some finite collection of
axioms, since the instances of Logical Equivalence that are not already theorems of
H include all of our infinitely many logical constants (the quantifiers ∀ and ∃ andidentity predicate = for each type ). But we can do the next best thing, namelyhave a small finite list of axioms for each logical constant. One particularly simple
axiomatization of this sort is given in Figure 4. It comprises one closed identity for
every identity predicate = , and two closed identities for every quantifier ∀ or ∃.All of these identities are easily seen to be instances of Logical Equivalence. For
example, the biconditional Xy ↔ Xy∨∀X, needed to prove Absorption-∨∀ fromLogical Equivalence, is a theorem of H because it is truth-functionally equivalent to
the-UI instance ∀X → Xy. Appendix A proves that the Quantifier Identities andIdentity Identity are sufficient to recover the remaining instances of Logical Equi-
valence. The proof works by using the identities to show that each axiom of H is
14Cashing out “the classical logic of higher-order quantification and identity” as H might seem
rather tendentious. After all, H goes beyond classical propositional logic not just by adding axioms
and rules governing the quantifiers and identity, but by adding the axiom-schemes  and , which
are not specifically about any of the logical constants. But as it turns out, it doesn’t matter. We
will shortly be considering some alternative axiomatizations of Classicism which make do with only
a small selection of instances of Logical Equivalence, and the biconditionals P ↔ Q that generate
instances look like good candidates to be part of any fragment of H that one might think of as a better
candidate of the label “the classical logic of higher-order quantification and identity”. Moreover, the
relevant biconditionals are theorems of the “existentially neutral” logic H− as well as of H; thus the
smallest H-theory containing every instance of the weakening of Logical Equivalence that requires
H− ⊢ P → Q is the same as the smallest H-theory containing Logical Equivalence. The smallest
H− theory containing the weaker schema is just minimally weaker: if we add ∃xe.x = x and close
under MP, we get Classicism back again.
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(yz.y = z) = (yz.∀X.Xy↔ Xz)The Identity Identity
(Xy.Xy ∨ ∀X) = (Xy.Xy)Absorption-∨∀
(Xp.p ∨ ∀X) = (Xp.∀y.p ∨Xy)Dist-∨∀
(Xy.Xy ∧ ∃X) = (Xy.Xy)Absorption-∧∃
(Xp.p ∧ ∃X) = (Xp.∃y.p ∧Xy)Dist-∧∃
Figure 4. The Classicist Identities
identical to ⊤ (using the Boolean identities for PC, the Absorption identities for UI
and EG, and the Identity Identity for Ref and LL), and then showing that the rules
of proof preserve identity to ⊤ (using the Boolean identities for MP and the Dist
identities for Gen and Inst).
In the same sense in which Booleanism implies that∧ and∨ are “interdefinable”,




If Classicism is true we would thus lose no expressive power in dropping one of
the connectives from our official signature. However this might be unhelpful for the
purposes of debating opponents of Classicism, some of whom might reject one or
both of ∀-def and ∃-def. (For example one could imagine someone who accepts the
Classicist Identities for ∀, but has some strange alternative take on ∃.) Similarly, the
Identity Identity is already of the right form to license eliminating all the identity
predicates from the signature in favour of the quantifiers. Although this particular
identification might well be accepted even by philosophers who don’t accept any
of the other Classicist or Boolean identities, there are (as we will mention in §1.5)
some important objections to Classicismwhichmight motivate rejecting the Identity
Identity. So again, for dialectical purposes, it will be helpful to keep identity in the
signature.
Here we have focused on identity, however related axiomatizations of Classicism
in terms of entailment are also possible; this is explored in appendix B.
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1.4 Axiomatizations with new rules
Onemight wonder whether Classicism is itself just a somewhat arbitrary fragment of
a more general picture, in the way we earlier claimed to be the case for Booleanism.
Why only accept identities corresponding to biconditionals provable from H, when
we now have a stronger theory C which proves further biconditionals, for which
we might also accept the corresponding identities? This motivates a, putatively
stronger, theory which includes the identities corresponding to biconditionals prov-
able in C; indeed a series of theories, each adding the identities corresponding to
biconditionals provable in its predecessor. The union of all these theories will be
closed under the rule:
Equiv+ If ⊢ P ↔ Q then ⊢ (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q).
But the picture of a series of stronger and stronger theories is completely wrong,
since as it turns out, C is already closed under Equiv+. Even though the only identit-
ies we added as axioms corresponded to biconditionals provable in H, the theorems
provable from these axioms also include all identities corresponding to bicondition-
als provable in C. Indeed, since any H-theory closed under Equiv+ must evidently
contain every instance of Logical Equivalence, C can be characterized as the smal-
lest H-theory closed under Equiv+. The availability of this axiomatization provides
further adds to our case for the centrality and naturalness of C as the endpoint of the
theoretical impulse that initially inspires Booleanism.15
We can also divide the job of Equiv+ up between two different inference rules:
If ⊢ P ↔ Q then ⊢ P = Q.Equiv
If ⊢ A = B then ⊢ (v.A) = (v.B).16
15Given -conversion, closing under Equiv+ is equivalent to closure under the following altern-
ative version of Equiv+:
Strong Equiv+ If ⊢ F v⃗↔ Gv⃗ then ⊢ F = G where v⃗ are not free in F or G.
(See Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri (n.d., §8.2): note that the version given there accidentally
omits the crucial restriction that v⃗ not be free in F or G, without which the rule is inconsistent.) If
we start with any theory that satisfies all the closure conditions other than  from the axiomatization
of H given in Figure 2, closing under Strong Equiv+ is equivalent to adding  and closing under
Equiv+. By  we have (X→ .X)Y →z ↔ (Xv.Xv)Y z, which we can feed into -Equiv+ to
get X.X = Xv.Xv, which straightforwardly yields . A nice feature of Strong Equiv+ is that if
we start with the very weak logic H0 mentioned in footnote7 and close under Strong Equiv+, we stillget Classicism (including the full-strength  axiom and the  axiom): see Bacon and Zeng 2021.
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Any H-theory closed under Equiv and  must evidently be closed under Equiv+, so
the smallest H-theory closed under Equiv and  includes C. Since Equiv is just the
n = 0 special case of Equiv+, C is closed under Equiv.17
One can think of Equiv+ as a “rule” counterpart of the following, much stronger,
axiom-scheme, telling us that relations are individuated by their extensions:
Extensionality ∀z⃗(Xz⃗↔ Y z⃗)→ X = Y
Similarly, Equiv and  can be thought of, respectively, as “rule” counterparts of the
following axiom-schemes:
(p↔ q)→ p = qThe Fregean Axiom
∀z(Xz = Y z)→ X = YFunctionality
Neither Extensionality, Functionality, nor the Fregean Axiom is a theorem of Clas-
sicism (as we will confirm in part 3), so the axioms really are strengthenings of the
corresponding rules.
Let Extensionalism be the smallest H-theory containing Extensionality; or, the
smallest H-theory containing the Fregean Axiom and Functionality; or equivalently
again, the smallest extension of C containing the Fregean Axiom.18 Extensionalism
16Alternatively we can replace  with
 If ⊢ Fv = Gv then ⊢ F = G where v is not free in F or G
In the presence of  and the identity axioms, closing under  is equivalent to adding  and closing
under .
17To see that C is closed under , remember that for (v.A) = (v.B) to even be well-formed in
our type system, A and B must be terms of some type of the form 1 → ⋯ → n → t. Let v be oftype 0. Choose distinct variables u⃗ of types 1… n that are not free in A or B; then if ⊢ A = B,we have ⊢ Au⃗ ↔ Bu⃗ by Ref and LL, which implies (vu⃗.A) = (vu⃗.B) by Equiv, which implies
(v.A) = (v.B) by . Note that this proof depends crucially on the fact that we our type system is
R. In the more general type system F , we think it is still true that the smallest H-theory containing
Logical Equivalence is closed under  , but the argument that this is the case is more involved.)
It is worth noting that H is already closed under  . This follows from the following fact: whenever
A = B is a theorem of H, A and B are -equivalent terms; so in particular if Fv = Gv is a theorem
where v is not free in F or G, Fv and Gv are -equivalent, which implies that F and G are, so
F = G is also a theorem of H. This fact can be proved using model-theoretic techniques developed
in Fritz, Lederman and Uzquiano forthcoming (see the remark about ‘DISTINCTNESS∼,, ’ on p. 15of that paper).
18The implication from the Fregean Axiom to Functionality in C follows from the fact that C
proves Modalized Functionality (see §1.5). Note that this depends on the fact that we are working
in the type system R; in the full functional type system F , the smallest extension of H containing
Extensionality is still the same as the smallest extension of C containing the Fregean Axiom, but
does not include the instances of Functionality for types ending in e.
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occupies an important position on themap of H-theories: it, and theories that include
it, are in a natural sense maximally coarse-grained. But—with due deference to the
distinghished historical roster of adherents of extensionalism, starting with Frege—
we take Extensionalism to be decisively refuted by arguments such as the following.
Although snow is white↔ snow is either white or not white, snow is white ≠ snow
is either white or not white, since it is necessary that snow is either white or not
white, but not necessary that snow is white. (There are many different senses of
‘necessary’ for which this argument is sound.)19
Classicism can thus be approached not only “from below”, by starting with H
or Booleanism and considering natural strengthenings, but “from above”, by start-
ing with Extensionalism and considering natural weakenings, specifically those that
replace axioms with corresponding rules.
1.5 Classicism and modal logic
Recall that □ abbreviates p.(p = (p ∨ ¬p)): observe that given Booleanism, any
tautology could be substituted for the formula p ∨ ¬p.20 The choice to use a neces-
sity symbol for this operator is appropriate here. Booleanism already includes all
instances of the following schemas:
□(P → Q)→ (□P → □Q)K
□P → PT
Classicism, unlike Booleanism, is also closed under the rule
Necessitation If ⊢ P then ⊢ □P
(This follows from Classicism’s being closed under Equiv, since if ⊢ P , ⊢ P ↔
(P∨¬P ).) Thus, in the setting of Classicism, the propositional logic of□ is a normal
modal logic. Classicism also goes beyond Booleanism by including all instances of
the schema:
4 □P → □□P
19Church’s ‘simple theory of types’ (Church 1940) contains Functionality (axiom 10) but he elects
not to add the Fregean Axiom. Henkin (1950) does add the latter, and it is standard in the systems
used for higher-order formalization of mathematics. Gandy (1956) reports Turing as expressing
suspicion of Extensionalism in terms that have thankfully become obsolete.
20Church (1951) discusses this definition of □ in the context of his ‘Alternative 2’; see also
Cresswell 1965.
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Indeed, it follows from results in Bacon 2018a that the set of propositional modal
formulas in□ derivable from Classicism is exactly the modal logic S4, the smallest
set of formulae containing all tautologies and instances of K, T, and 4, and closed
under MP and Nec.21
Classicism includes the following modal weakening of Extensionality, which
can perform many of the same argumentative roles as that principle:
Intensionality □∀z⃗(Xz⃗↔ Y z⃗)→ X = Y
To see that this is a theorem of Classicism, consider the following instance of Logical
Equivalence:
z⃗.(Xz⃗ ∧ ∀z⃗.(Xz⃗ ↔ Y z⃗)) = z⃗.(Y z⃗ ∧ ∀z⃗.(Xz⃗↔ Y z⃗))
This implies
(∀z⃗.(Xz⃗↔ Y z⃗)) = ⊤→ (z⃗.Xz⃗ ∧ ⊤) = (z⃗.Y z⃗ ∧ ⊤)
which implies Intensionality, by Booleanism and -conversion. Note that the com-
bination of Intensionality with Equiv or Necessitation implies every instance of Lo-
gical Equivalence, and thus serves as another possible axiomatization of Classicism.
Just as Extensionality is equivalent to the conjunction of Functionality and the
Fregean Axiom, Intensionality is equivalent given that□ behaves as a normal modal
operator to the conjunction of the following two axioms:
□(p↔ q)→ p = qModalized Fregean Axiom
□∀z(Xz = Y z)→ X = Y 22Modalized Functionality
Classicism can be axiomatized by the combination ofModalized Functionality with
21We may interpret the language of propositional modal logic in the signature of higher-order
logic augmented with type t constants for each propositional letter in the straightforward way. (Inter-
preting the letters as themselves, ∧ for∧, etc., andmost importantly, interpreting the□ ofmodal logic
with the defined operator p.p = ⊤.) One of the results in Bacon 2018a implies that any transitive
reflexive Kripke model of the modal language can be extended to a higher-order model of Classicism
over this signature, that makes exactly the same sentences true (modulo the translation). Because S4
is complete for transitive reflexive Kripke models, Classicism cannot prove any propositional modal
formulas not already proven from S4. The soundness of S4 under in this interpretation in Classicism
is also spelled out there. Cresswell (1965) shows how once □ is defined in terms of identity, the
principles of S4 can derived from some minimal principles about propositional identity. See also
Suszko 1975 and Wiredu 1979.
22To derive Modalized Functionality from Intensionality, remember that for an instance of
Modalized Functionality to be well formed, the variables X and Y must both be of some type
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the Equiv rule.2324
Each of these three principles partially articulates the idea that propositions,
properties and relations are “individuated by necessary equivalence”, in the present
sense of ‘necessary’. The Modalized Fregean Axiom (which is already a theorem
of Booleanism) states the identity of necessarily equivalent propositions, and Inten-
sionality of necessarily coextensive relations.25
A widely discussed version of this thesis about individuation, associated with
philosophers like Lewis and Stalnaker, holds that metaphysically necessary coex-
tensiveness suffices for identity. Note, however, it is not at all clear that metaphysical
necessity should be identified with □. Classicists who take the two statuses to be
distinct need not accept the Lewis-Stalnaker view, although proponents of that view
will themselves accept the identity of metaphysical necessity and□ (since they ac-
cept their metaphysically necessary coextensiveness). Moreover, while Lewis and
Stalnaker take metaphysical necessity to obey S5, it is consistent with Classicism
that many theorems of S5 fail for □. So there are a range of views compatible
with Classicism which diverge significantly from the Lewis-Stalnaker picture, and
will call for a set of modelling tools substantially different from the most familiar
versions of the possible worlds framework.
Indeed, versions of the thought that necessary equivalence suffices for identity
can been articulated for different notions of ‘necessity’: the narrower the necessity
in question the stronger and more contentious the thesis. Given Classicism,□ can
be shown to be the broadest (most demanding) necessity, given reasonable purely lo-
gical definitions of ‘necessity operator’ and ‘at least as broad as’.26 Accordingly, we
0 → ⋯ → n → t. If □∀z.(Xz = Y z) we have □∀z∀u1…∀un.(Xzu⃗ ↔ Y zu⃗), which implies
(u⃗z.Xzu⃗) = (u⃗z.Y zu⃗) by Intensionality; this -reduces to (z.Xz) = (z.Y z), which -reduces to
X = Y .
23This axiomatization is in Bacon 2018a. Myhill (1958) reconstructs ‘Alternative 2’ from Church
1951 using Necessitation and Functionality.
24The above remarks all assume the type system R. The situation is somewhat different in type
system F . In this setting, there are new instances of Modalized Functionality involving types ending
in e, which are not theorems of the smallestH-theory containing all instances of Logical Equivalence.
This shouldn’t be too surprising: we have motivated Classicism by the thought that logical equival-
ence suffices for identity, where logical equivalence is a relation between sentences—i.e. provability
of the biconditional in H—not singular terms. The model theories we will be developing in part 3
can be generalized naturally to F , but the logic of the relevant classes of models is what we might
call “Strong Classicism”, which includes all the instances of Modalized Functionality rather than just
those that can be derived from Logical Equivalence.
25Modalized Functionality, by contrast, is concerns a less demanding notion of necessary “equi-
valence” — necessary cofunctionality — which can be applied even to operations that only belong
to the non-relational type system F , such as operations of type e→ e.
26See Bacon 2018a for details, and Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., Bacon n.d.(a), ch. 8 for
further discussion. The result is fairly robust with respect to different precisifications of ‘necessity
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shall pronounce□ as ‘it is broadly necessary that’. Viewed in this light, Intensional-
ism captures the kernel of the thought that properties and relations are individuated
by necessary equivalence that is common to all its different versions.
Another controversial consequence of Classicism is the Converse Barcan For-
mula (Barcan 1946):27
CBF □∀xP → ∀x□P
To see why CBF is controversial, observe that it implies the following schema:
Broad Necessitism ∀x□∃y(y = x)
Take P in CBF to be the formula ∃y.y = x, we get a conditional whose consequent
is Necessitism and whose antecedent, □∀x∃y(y = x), is an uncontroversial the-
orem of C (since ∀x∃y(y = x) is a theorem of H and C is closed under neces-
sitation).Broad Necessitism says that everything is broadly necessarily identical to
something; since broad necessity entails every other form of necessity, it follows
that nothing could have failed to be something, in any ordinary sense of ‘could’.
Many philosophers—“contingentists”, in the terminology of Williamson 2013—
have taken this to be false, indeed obviously false.28 We disagree, but a full de-
fence of this implication of Classicism would take us too far afield (see Williamson
2013, Goodman 2016, Fine 2017b, Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d.). Here,
we will content ourselves with noting that many contingentists have been happy to
help themselves, either as primitives or as the result of some kind of honest toil, to
so-called “outer” or “possibilist” quantifiers Π and Σ, for which they are happy to
accept the analogue of CBF and Broad Necessitism. It isn’t obvious how much is
really at stake in the debate between those who are willing to accept CBF as writ-
ten above and those who reject it but accept the analogue with Π instead of ∀: even
thoughΠ seems to behave logically as a quantifier and to entail ∀, proponents of this
view refuse for some reason to say that Π is the unrestricted universal quantifier and
∀ is some restriction of it. Anyhow, we invite contingentists who can make sense of
these quantifiers to reinterpret all our uses of ∀ and ∃ in the relevant way.
operator’, such as whether you build in normality or not.
27To prove it in Classicism one uses the fact that it is closed under Necessitation and Gen, and
contains the K schema. Applying Necessitation to an instance of UI we get□(∀xP → P ). K lets us
distribute the necessity,□∀xP → □P , and Gen yields□∀xP → ∀x□P .
28See, for example, Kripke 1963, Fine 1977, Fritz and Goodman n.d., Stalnaker 2012, Plantinga
1974, Menzel 1990.
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2 Extensions of Classicism
In this part of the paper, we will map out some theories that strengthen Classicism.
Section 1.4 already discussed one important strengthening, namely Extensionalism,
which can be got by adding the axiom scheme Extensionality (or the combination
of Functionality and the Fregean Axiom) to Classicism. But there are several inter-
esting theories that are stronger than Classicism, but weaker than Extensionalism,
and which are not subject to the kinds of counterexamples that make us find Ex-
tensionalism to be of merely historical and mathematical interest. Sections 2.1–2.3
will explore some of these theories. Sections 2.4–2.6 will then turn to some quite
different ways of strengthening Classicism in a fine-grained direction.
2.1 Towards Extensionalism I: Coarse-grainedness principles
One thing we might consider adding to Classicism is the principle of Functionality
from §2.1:
Functionality ∀z(Xz = Y z)→ X = Y
So long as we don’t also add the Fregean Axiom, this will not allow us to infer
that coextensive properties are identical. Rather, it captures the idea that proper-
ties are completely determined by their applicative behaviour with respect to their
arguments.
In understanding what Functionality says, it’s useful to note a couple of equival-
ents:
Proposition 2.1. Functionality is equivalent in Classicism to each of the following
schemas:
∀x□P → □∀xPBF
∀x(p ≤ Fx)→ p ≤ ∀xFx.29Tractarianism
BF is the Barcan Formula, taken an axiom in the quantified modal logic of Barcan
1946. Tractarianism says that the universal generalization of a property behaves like
the conjunctions of all its instances, i.e. the propositions that predicate that property.
29To derive Tractarianism from Functionality, suppose ∀x(p ≤ Fx); then F = x.(Fx ∨ p) by
Functionality, so ∀xFx = ∀x(Fx∨p) = ∀xFx∨p by Dist-∨∀. To derive BF from Tractarianism, just
plug in ⊤ for p. And to derive Functionality from BF, note that ∀x(Fx = Gx) implies ∀x□(Fx ↔
Gx) by LL, which implies□∀x(Fx↔ Gx) by BF, which implies F = G by Intensionalism.)
20
Instantiation already tells us that it entails all the instances; Tractarianism adds that
it is entailed by anything that entails all the instances, just as a conjunction entails
its conjuncts and is entailed by anything that entails all of its conjuncts (see the
conjunction and elimination rules for conjunction). (Such an assimilation of quanti-
fication with infinitary conjunction is propounded by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus:
Wittgenstein 1961, p. 6.0001; see Proops 2017.) Many have objected to it on the
grounds that if there could be new objects, distinct from all the objects there already
are, there’s nothing to stop there from being a proposition, p, and a property F , such
that p entails Fx for each object, but is compatible with there being possibly new
things that aren’t F , and thus is a counterexample to Tractarianism.30 The informal
picture often associated with BF, and thus Functionality and Tractarianism, is that
there cannot be anything new.
A further strengthening is to place □ in front of any of Functionality, BF or
Tractarianism. This results in the system HFE outlined in Bacon 2018a. The fact
that this actually strengthens these principles suggests we have to be careful about
the intuitive gloss on Functionality as ‘there can’t be new things’, since given S4,
it seems that any claim that was properly glossed like that should be necessary if
true. Once we look at models where these principles are contingently true (in Ap-
pendix D), we will see more reasons to think the slogan ‘there can’t be new things’
should really be associated with the necessitated versions of these schemes.
One might think that principles at the level of generality of BF and Functionality
are necessary if true. Perhaps this attitude is correct as far as metaphysical neces-
sity is concerned. But it’s hard to see why the mere generality of P should generate
any presumption that P , if true, is broadly necessary, i.e. identical to P ∨ ¬P . If
the corresponding attitude to metaphysical necessity is appropriate, then perhaps
we should take this as an argument for the distinctness of broad necessity and meta-
physical necessity, rather than an argument against the view that general principles
like BF and Functionality are true but not broadly necessary.
Another noteworthy consequence of Extensionalism that is not a theorem of
Classicism is the necessity of distinctness:
ND x ≠ y→ □(x ≠ y)
By contrast, the necessity of identity is already a theorem of Classicism:
NI x = y→ □(x = y)
This follows, by a well-known argument that seems to have been first been dis-
30The argument against Tractarianism in Russell (1924, lecture 5) can be construed this way if
we take Russell’s ‘it is a further fact that’ to imply ‘not entailed by’.
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covered by Quine (see Burgess 2014), from the LL-instance x = y → (z.□(x =
z))x → (z.□(x = z))y, together with □(x = x), the necessitation of a Ref-
instance.
ND also has some more familiar equivalents:
Proposition 2.2. ND is equivalent in Classicism to each of:
◊p→ □◊p5
p→ □◊pB
To derive 5 from the type-t instance of ND, substitute ⊤ for q and ¬P for p. To
derive B from 5, use the T axiom in the dual form P → ◊P . And to complete the
circle of entailments, we may can derive ND (for any type) from B: suppose x ≠ y;
then□¬□(x = y) by B; but□(x = y → □(x = y)) by the necessitation of NI; so
□(x ≠ y) (see Prior 1963, pp. 206–7).
Just as in the case of Functionality, these principles do not imply their own ne-
cessitations (i.e. the necessitations of their universal closures) in Classicism. But
it’s hard to think of a principled reason for accepting, say, ND that would not extend
to its necessitated analogue:
□ND □∀x(x ≠ y → □(x ≠ y))
We will refer to the result of adding □ND (or □5 or □B) to C C5, by analogy to
the modal system S5. Insofar as any theory in this domain counts as “orthodox”, C5
does.
One might have expected that the idea that distinct things are necessarily distinct
would be entirely independent of the question of new things. But this turns out to
be wrong:
Proposition 2.3. BF (and hence also Functionality and Tractarianism) is a theorem
of C5.
The proof of this is essentially due to Prior (1956).31
In the other direction, we have the following novel result:
Proposition 2.4. ND and BF jointly imply□ND in Classicism.
For given ND, we have □(x = y) ∨□(x ≠ y). With 4, this implies □(x = y) ∨
□□(x ≠ y), and hence□(x = y∨□(x ≠ y)), i.e.□(x ≠ y → □(x ≠ y)). By Gen,
∀xy□(x ≠ y → □(x ≠ y)), which implies □ND by BF. So far, then, our map of
systems including Classicism is as depicted in Figure 5.








Figure 5. Coarse-grainings of Classicism
2.2 Towards Extensionalism II: Lattice-theoretic principles
The hierarchy of strengthenings of Classicism explored in the previous section is
particularly important, both philosophically and because of the ways in which the
coarser-grained views lend themselves to familiar and simple model theories. This
section will survey three other principles inspired by conditions from the theory of
Boolean algebras as formulated in classical first-order set theory, a common the-
oretical framework for modelling propositions. We will see that against the present
foundational framework of higher-order logic, the relations between these principles
are markedly different.
A “complete” Boolean algebra is one inwhich every set of elements has a greatest
lower bound: a lower bound of the set that is ≥ every other lower bound of the set,
where being a lower bound of a set means being ≤ every element of the set. Taking
this as inspiration, consider the following principle:
Boolean Completeness ∀X→t.∃y .GLB yX
where:
GLB ≔ yX→t.∀z .LB zX ↔ z ≤ y
LB ≔ zX→t.∀y .Xy→ y ≤ z
Boolean Completeness is thus analogous to the claim that each relational type 
forms a complete Boolean algebra under entailment, except that quantification into
Suppose ∀x□Fx. Then□◊∀x□Fx by B. Using CBF we can infer□∀x◊□Fx, and finally, by the
necessitation of B,□∀xFx.
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type  → t plays the role of quantification over sets.
To see that Boolean Completeness follows from Extensionalism, it suffices to
note that Extensionalism implies that for any propertyX (of propositions, properties,
or relations), falling under everythingX(that is, y⃗.∀Z.XZ → Zy⃗) is a GLB of the
X things. 32
The second of our principles also corresponds to awell-known property of Boolean
algebras. An atom of a Boolean algebra is an element such that the only thing below
it is the bottom element; an algebra is atomic just in case every element is either the
bottom element, an atom, or above at least one atom. This corresponds to a thesis
about the propositions, properties, and relations of some type :
Atomicity ∀x(x ≤ ¬x ∨ ∃y(Atom y ∧ y ≤ x))
where:
Atom ≔ y.∀z((z ≤ y ∧ z ≠ y)↔ z ≤ ¬z)
For the special case where  is t we could equally well have defined the corres-
ponding notion of an atom to be a broadly possible proposition that entails each
proposition or its negation. The word ‘world’ would also be a pretty good name for
atoms of type t, since given Atomicity, the broadly possible propositions are exactly
those entailed by an atom. Extensionalism implies Atomicity.33
If we are calling propositional atoms ‘worlds’, it is natural to use ‘actual world’
to mean ‘true propositional atom’. Obviously there can only be at most one actual
world, since any two atoms are incompatible. Call the claim that there is an actual
world,
Actuality ∃p(p ∧ ∀q(q → p ≤ q))
Equivalently: any property of propositions all of whose instances are true has a true
32To see that it’s a lower bound ofX, suppose thatXu. Then given the FregeanAxiomXu = ⊤, so
(x⃗.Xu→ ux⃗) = (x⃗.ux⃗) = u, so (x⃗.∀Z.XZ → Zx⃗) ≤ u. To see that it’s a greatest lower bound of
X, suppose y is a lower bound of X. Then ∀x⃗.yx⃗→ (∀z.Xz→ zx⃗). By Extensionality, this implies
that y ≤ (x⃗.∀Z.XZ → Zx⃗). Note that without Extensionalism, there is no guarantee that having
every X property is even a lower bound of the X properties, let alone a greatest lower bound. For
example, even though being president is a widely-discussed property, having every widely-discussed
property plausibly fails to entail being president.
33In type t it provides a witness: we have Atomt ⊤. More generally, where  is ⃗→ t, Extension-alism implies ∀y⃗.Atom (z⃗.z⃗ = y⃗), and moreover x ≤ ¬x is equivalent given Extensionalism to
¬∃y⃗.xy⃗; if this is false, we have (z⃗.z⃗ = y⃗) ≤ x and Atom (z⃗.z⃗ = y⃗).
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lower bound.34 Extensionalism obviously entails Actuality and provides a witness,
namely ⊤.
In C5, the three principles we have just introduced are intimately related to each
other:
Proposition 2.5. Boolean Completeness is equivalent to Actuality in C5.
Proposition 2.6. Atomicity is equivalent to□Actuality (and hence also to□Boolean
Completeness) in C5.
For those used to using the theory of Boolean algebras to guide their reasoning about
propositions, this should be surprising, for one can easily construct atomic Boolean
algebras that are not complete, and complete Boolean algebras that are not atomic.
These facts illustrate the danger of using the theory of arbitrary Boolean algebras in
guiding one’s theorizing about propositions.
Without the assumption of C5, there are more surprises for this way of think-
ing. On the model of propositions as Boolean algebras worlds—i.e. propositions
that settle the truths—are atoms, including the actual world. Given that Atomicity
implies that every proposition is the disjunction (LUB) of the atoms that entail it,
one might expect Atomicity to imply Actuality. But surprisingly this does not fol-
low in Classicism: in Appendix D we will see that Classicism is consistent with the
hypothesis that although every truth is entailed by some atom, every atom is false.
Similarly, if there’s a conjunction (GLB) of all the truths, as Boolean Completeness
guarantees, one might expect that it would witness the truth of Actuality: but in fact,
in general there is no obvious reason why the GLB of some truths should be true
(or even possible), so Boolean Completeness does not seem to imply Actuality.35
In the other direction, one might have thought that if, necessarily, there is an actual
world, then every possible proposition must be entailed by an atom, namely the pro-
position that would have been the actual world if it had been true. However, this
reasoning forgets the fact that without propositional BF, we cannot import a merely
possibly existing world into actuality, and without ND, that even if an actually exist-
ing proposition is possibly a world it needn’t actually be, since it it might actually be
decomposable into stronger consistent propositions that become identical had it been
34Note that Actuality implies the analogous generalization about arbitrary predicate types:
Actual Profile ∀x⃗∃Y (Y x⃗ ∧ ∀Z(Zx⃗→ Y ≤ Z))
For suppose thatw is a witness to Actuality; then for a given choice of x⃗, y⃗.w∧x1 = y1∧⋯∧xn = ynis a witness to Actual Profile.
35We conjecture that the combination of Boolean Completeness and the negation of Actuality is
consistent, although we do not have a proof.
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a world. In Appendix D we show that even given BF, □Actuality does not imply
Atomicity by constructing models in which the latter situation occurs (an atomless
proposition is possible atomic).
Proposition 2.5 will follow from results involving certain other principles to be
introduced in the next section. The right-to-left direction of Proposition 2.6 can
be established by showing that, given □ND, everything that is possibly an atom
is in fact an atom. Suppose ◊Atom y: possibly, everything is either entailed by or
inconsistent with y. By BF (which follows from□ND), everything is either possibly
entailed by or possibly inconsistent with y. But by ND, anything possibly entailed
by y is entailed by y, and anything possibly inconsistent with y is inconsistent with
y, so y is in fact an atom. Now suppose□Actuality and p ≠ ⊥. Then p is compatible
with there being an actual world. Then by BF there is a proposition w such that it
is possible that p be true while w is an actual world; but then w must in fact be a
world, so we have the desired result that there is a world compatible with p.
For the other direction of Proposition 2.6, we actually need only BF rather than
the full strength of C5:
Proposition 2.7. Atomicity and BF jointly imply□Actuality.
For given BF, every atom entails that it entails every truth (and hence that it it is a
true atom, and hence there is a true atom), i.e.
Atomw→ w ≤ ∀q(q → w ≤ q)
By Tractarianism (equivalent to BF), the consequent is equivalent to ∀q.w ≤ (q →
w ≤ q). But this is true when w is an atom since when w ≤ q, in which case q →
(w ≤ q) is ⊤ and hence entailed by everything, while when w ≤ ¬q, w ≤ (q → p)
for any p. Thus, if every proposition other than ⊥ is compatible with some atom,
every proposition other than ⊥ must be compatible with Actuality, so the negation
of Actuality must be identical to ⊥, i.e. the necessitation of Actuality is true.
Goodsell and Yli-Vakkuri (***) show thatC5+Atomicity has a consequence that
is worthy of special attention:
No Pure Contingency P → □P , where P is closed and contains no non-logical
constants.
Equivalently, ∀x⃗ Q→ □Q[a⃗∕x⃗], whereQ contains no nonlogical constants and has
free variables in x⃗.36 No Pure Contingency can also be consistently combined with
C5 and the denial of Atomicity (indeed with Atomlessness), and with many other
36This is one direction of the biconditional ‘Logical Necessity’ schema discussed in Bacon 2020.
The other direction will be discussed below.
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combinations of the principles we have discussed in this and the preceding section.
And it has a certain plausibility. It can be derived from the combination of an ac-
count of the status of logical truth in the spirit of Bolzano (2004), Tarski (1959),
and Williamson (2003), on which closed sentences with only logical constants are
automatically logically true if true at all, together with the natural idea that the ne-
cessitation of any logical truth is itself a logical truth. However this is not by itself a
strong argument for No Pure Contingency, since “logical truth” is a term of art, and
a rather vexed one: insofar as one doubted No Pure Contingency one should suspect
that the argument just conflates two different interpretations of ‘logical truth’.
2.3 Towards Extensionalism III: Comprehension principles
Some formulations of second and higher-order logic take as primitive a comprehen-
sion schema along the lines of
∃X ∀y(Xy ↔ P ).
Since our present system has -terms this is in fact a theorem: the existential is
witnessed by the term y.P .37 However Classicism is neutral about certain other
comprehension-style principles which this section will survey.
Our first principle requires some preliminary motivation. Let a persistent prop-
erty, relation, or proposition be one that entails its own necessitation:
Persistent ≔ Y .Y ≤ (z⃗.□Y z⃗)
The modal behaviour of a persistent property is a bit like that of a set or plurality,
according to standard modal set theory/plural logic. Any member of a set is ne-
cessarily a member of that set; any one of some things is necessarily one of those
things; similarly any instance of a persistent property is necessarily an instance. But
the standard view of sets and pluralities goes further than this by ruling out the pos-
sibility of a set of plurality acquiring any new members beyond those that it in fact
has. If C5 fails, persistent properties need not behave like this; for example, when
a, b, c are distinct but possibly a = b∧ a ≠ c, being identical to c or such that a = b
is a persistent property that in fact has only one instance but could have two. For
the modal behaviour of a property to be really analogous to that of a set or plural-
ity, it must be not only persistent but inextensible: necessarily such as to entail any
property had necessarily by all of its instances:
Inextensible ≔ Y .□∀X(∀z⃗(Y z⃗ → □Xz⃗)→ Y ≤ X)
37 ensures that, for any y, (y.P )y↔ P .
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In our example, x.x = c∨a = b is not inextensible, since it fails to entail x.x = c,
even though that property is necessary to its one and only instance. The property
of being a member of a given set or being one of some things, by contrast, would
normally be thought of as inextensible: if each of some things is necessarily F , then
necessarily anything that is one of them (belongs to the set of them) is F .38
Define a rigid property (or relation or proposition) as one that is both persistent
and inextensible. We can simplify this as follows:
Rigid1,…,n ≔ Y .□∀X.(∀z⃗.Y z⃗→ □Xz⃗)↔ Y ≤ X
The principle of interest says that every property (or relation or proposition) is co-
extensive with a rigid one:
Rigid Comprehension ∀X.∃Y (Rigid(Y ) ∧ ∀z⃗(Xz⃗↔ Y z⃗))
This can be thought of on the model of a comprehension principle for pluralities
or sets, according to which every property is coextensive with a plurality or set.
This assumption is both natural in itself, and needed for the regimentation of some
natural-language modal claims not ostensibly about pluralities or sets, for example
the most salient reading of ‘Mary could have had all John’s favourite properties’ (see
Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., §1.4). Rigid Comprehension also helps to
provide a natural account of the prevalent use of extensionalist reasoning in math-
ematics (see Church 1940, Myhill 1958). Extensionalism entails that everything is
rigid, and thus trivially implies Rigid Comprehension.39
Like all the principles from the previous section, Rigid Comprehension follows
from the claim that there are only finitely many entities of the relevant types. Figid
Comprehension also implies two of those:
Proposition 2.8. Rigid Comprehension implies Boolean Completeness.
Proposition 2.9. Rigid Comprehension implies Actuality.
38See Linnebo 2013 and Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., §1.5. An inextensible property
is one for which BF necessarily holds for the quantifiers restricted by it. In C5, persistence entails
inextensibility (see Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri n.d., propositions C4 and C5).
39If we weaken ‘Rigid’ in Rigid Comprehension to ‘Persistent’, the resulting ‘Persistent Compre-
hension’ principle is equivalent to Actuality. The implication from it to Actuality can be recovered
from the proof of Actuality from Rigid Comprehension below, which does not mention inextensibil-
ity. To derive Persistent Comprehension from Actuality, supposewwitnesses Actuality; then for any
X, y⃗.w ≤ Xy⃗ is persistent and coextensive with X. We might also consider replacing ‘Rigid’ with
‘Inextensible’. The resulting principle also follows from Actuality, since if w witnesses Actuality;
then for any X, y⃗.w ∧Xy⃗ is inextensible and coextensive with X.
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Let’s start with Proposition 2.8. To show that some property of propositions, F ,
has a greatest lower bound one takes a rigid property, G, coextensive with F and
considers the proposition ∀pGp (much as we did in the proof of Boolean Complete-
ness from Extensionalism).40 Parallel arguments establish the proposition at other
relational types. To show that Rigid Comprehension entails Actuality, one takes a
rigid property, T , coextensive with the truths (i.e. p.p) and defines the actual world
as ∀tp.T p.41In the setting of C5, Rigid Comprehension not only implies but is equivalent to
Actuality:
Proposition 2.10. Actuality implies Rigid Comprehension in C5.
To prove this, one first shows that in C5 anything persistent is also inextensible.42
It then suffices to show that Actuality implies that every property F is coextensive
with a persistent one: if w is the actual world (i.e. the witness to Actuality) then the
persistent property in question can be defined as being such that w entails you are
F (i.e. x(w ≤ Fx)); this is persistent since entailments are necessary if true, and
coextensive with F , since w entails only the truths. One can extend this argument
to relations straightforwardly.
Combining Propositions 2.8 and 2.10 gives us the right-to-left direction of Pro-
position 2.5 (stated without proof in §2.2): Actuality implies Boolean Completeness
in C5.
Here are two other results involving Rigid Comprehension whose proofs we give
in footnotes:
Proposition 2.11. □Atomicity, Boolean Completeness, and BF jointly imply Rigid
Comprehension.43
40Let X be of type → t, let X∗ be the rigid property coextensive with X; and let U of type t be
z⃗.∀Y (X∗Y → Y z⃗). To show that U is a GLB of X, notice that since X and X∗ are coextensive,
any V is a lower bound ofX just in case it is a lower bound ofX∗, i.e. ∀Y (X∗Y → □∀z⃗(V z⃗→ Y z⃗))
By the rigidity of X, this is true just in case □∀Y (X∗Y → ∀z⃗(V z⃗ → Y z⃗)) which is equivalent to
the claim that V entails U .
41This proposition is true, since T is coextensive with truth. And by Instantiation it entails (T p →
p) for every p. But when p is true, T p is true, so by the persistence of T ,□T p hence (T p → p) = p;
thus the proposition entails every truth.
42SupposeX is persistent and ∀y⃗(Xy⃗→ □Zy⃗), i.e. ∀y⃗(¬Xy⃗∨□Zy⃗). By B (equivalent to ND),
we have ∀y⃗(¬Xy⃗ → □¬□Xy⃗), and hence by the persistence of X, ∀y⃗(¬Xy⃗ → □¬Xy⃗). So we
can strengthen our assumption to ∀y⃗(□¬Xy⃗ ∨□Zy⃗), which implies ∀y⃗□(¬Xy⃗ ∨Zy⃗), i.e. X ≤ Z.
Using□ND we can necessitate this result.
43LetX be some property, F be the property of being a haecceity of anX thing (i.e. Y .∃z(Xz∧
Y = x(z = x))), and X∗ be the least upper bound of F . We show that X∗ is coextensive with X
and rigid.
(i) Every X is X∗. Suppose z is X; then y.y = z is F and hence entails X∗, hence Xz.
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Proposition 2.12. Rigid Comprehension and BF jointly imply□BF.44
To state our second comprehension-style principle, define a functional binary
relation of a given type → → t in the obvious way as one that relates everything
of type  to exactly one thing of type :
Functional, ≔ U →→t.∀x∃y(Uxy ∧ ∀z(Uxz→ y = z))
Quantification over functional relations provides one natural higher-order way of
regimenting the quantification over “functions” that comes so naturally to those
schooled in standard mathematics. But in the case where  is a relational type, there
is another natural way of regimenting informal quantification over “functions from
type- things to type- things”, namely as quantification into type →. Indeed the
use of the word “function” in connection with types of the form → has very deep
roots in the history of higher order logic as well as its contemporary use. Obviously
any x of type  →  corresponds to a unique functional relation of type →  → t,
namely yz.z = xy. Our principle lets us turn this around by positing something of
(ii) Every X∗ is X. Actuality follows from our assumptions by Proposition 2.6, so there is a true
world-proposition, w. Then (y.w → Xy) is an upper bound of F , since if y.y = z is F , Xz is
true and so entailed by w, which implies that□∀y(y = x → (w → Xy)). Since X∗ is a least upper
bound, X∗ entails y.(w→ Xy): so if z is X∗, then Xz ∨ ¬w, and since w and Xz.
(iii) X∗ is persistent. If z is X, then x.x = z entails X∗, so x.□x = z entails x.□X∗, and by
NI, x.x = z entails x.□X∗. So□X∗ is an upper bound of F . Since X∗ is a least upper bound of
F , it follows that X∗ entails□X∗.
(iv) X∗ is inextensible. We will show ∀Y ∀z□(∀x(X∗x → □Y x) → □(X∗z → Y z)) and then
appeal to BF. Suppose for contradiction that ◊(∀x(X∗x → □Y x) ∧ ◊(X∗z ∧ ¬Y z)). Let w be an
atom that entails ∀x(X∗x→ □Y x) ∧◊(X∗z∧¬Y z). Sow entails ∀x(X∗x→ □Y x) and that there
is an atom w′ that entails X∗z ∧ ¬Y z. So by BF there are w and w′ such that w entails:
∀x(X∗x→ □Y x) ∧ Atom(w′) ∧w′ ≤ (X∗z ∧ ¬Y z).
Without loss of generality, we may assume in addition that w′ is the GLB of the propositions p
such that that w entails that p = w′. (If it isn’t, let w′′ be the GLB of the propositions such that
w ≤ (p = w′); then w′′ will also be the GLB of the p such that w ≤ (p = w′′).). Now let
H ≔ x.(w′ → Y x). We’ll show thatH is an upper bound of F , and hence entailed by X∗, which
is a contradiction since w′ is possible (since possibly an atom) and entails that X∗z and ¬Y z, and
hence ¬Hz. Let u be any X thing. We have □X∗u by parts (i) and (iii); so w entails X∗u. Since
w entails ∀x(X∗x → □Y x), w also entails that□Y u and thus that w′ ≤ Y u. Since w′ is the GLB
above, w′ must in fact entail Y u. (For suppose not: then w′ ∧ Y u is stronger than w′, but w entails
w′ = (w′ ∧ Y u).) So□Hu. Thus for any u that is X,□∀y(y = u → Hu), so H is an upper bound
of F , and thus X∗ entailsH .
44To prove this, let F be a rigid property coextensive with self-identity. But since F is inextens-
ible, we have □∀Y (∀x(Fx → □Y x) → □∀x(Fx → Y x), But since everything is F , □∀xFx by
the persistence of F , so □∀xFx by BF, so we can simply the above to □∀Y (∀x□Y x → □∀xY x,
i.e.□BF.
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type →  corresponding to every functional relation:
Plenitude ∀R→→t(Functional(R)→ ∃Y → ∀x(Rx(Y x)))
To see that the  = t case follows fromExtensionalism, one defines Y as the property
of being a type- thing that bears R to something true.45 By contrast with Rigid
Comprehension (which is arguably deeply rooted in ordinary-language judgements),
Plenitude is on shakier philosophical ground, since the relaxed attitude to the word
“function” that it licenses might well be dismissed as a confusion.46
Plenitude follows much more obviously from a version of the Axiom of Choice
that is not a theorem of Extensionalism, although it is a theorem of several influential
systems (including those of Church 1940 and Henkin 1950). Let’s call this:
Functional Choice ∀R→→t(Serial(R)→ ∃Y →∀x(Rx(Y x)))
where
Serial ≔ R.∀x∃yRxy
Given the central role of Choice in large parts of mathematics, this might seem to
provide the basis for an argument for Plenitude. But for the purposes of formalizing
Choice-based mathematics, the following weaker Choice schema will do perfectly
fine:
Relational Choice ∀R→→t(Serial(R)→
∃S→→t(Functional(S) ∧ ∀xy(Sxy→ Rxy)))
In fact, Functional Choice is easily seen to be equivalent to the conjunction of Re-
lational Choice and Plenitude.
We will not further discuss Relational Choice here since we are primarily con-
cerned with principles which follow from Extensionalism, but as far as we know, it
and its negation are consistent with all consistent combinations of the principles on
our list.47
45Since Rx⊤ = ⊤ whenever Rx⊤ and Rx⊤ = ⊥ whenever Rx⊥, Rx(Rx⊤) in either case, so
Plenitude is witnessed by x.Rx⊤. More generally, when  is ⃗→ t, Plenitude will be witnessed by
xy⃗.∃Z(RxZ ∧Zy⃗).
46Plenitude, and further reasons for not taking it to be obviously true, are discussed in Dorr 2016,
§6. It also occurs as an axiom—the ‘Typed Comprehension Schema’—in Walsh 2016.
47The other principle we need to add to Extensionalism to get the Simple Theory of Types is
an axiom of infinity guaranteeing the existence of infinitely many individuals. This too seems to
be consistent with all consistent combinations of our principles; indeed, we can have an axiom of
infinity for all types including t, which is obviously inconsistent with Extensionalism. The denial of
infinity for type t obviously implies both Atomicity and Actual World.
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Apart from being interesting in its own right, Plenitude also serves as a useful
bridge between several of the other principles we have discussed. Here is one crucial
fact:
Proposition 2.13. Plenitude implies ND.
For if x ≠ y, there is a functional relation that maps x to ⊤ and everything else to
⊥ (namely, zw.(x = z ∧ w = ⊤) ∨ (x ≠ z ∧ w = ⊥)), so Plenitude implies that
there is a Z (of type  → t) such that Zx = ⊤ and Zy = ⊥. Since □(⊥ ≠ ⊤), it
follows that□(Zx ≠ Zy), and hence that□(x ≠ y).
We can also use Plenitude to prove the leftover left-to-right direction of Propos-
ition 2.5, as a consequence of the following facts:
Proposition 2.14. Boolean Completeness implies Plenitude in C5.
Proposition 2.15. Plenitude implies Actuality.
For Proposition 2.14, suppose that R is a functional relation between propositions
(the general case is proved similarly). The trick to obtaining the required Y of type
t → t is to construct it as a limit from below: take the least upper bound of the
properties Z that map the proposition p to something entailing the proposition to
which p bears R.48 For Proposition 2.15, consider the functional relation that maps
every truth to itself and every falsehood to the tautology: pq.(p∧p = q)∨(¬p∧q =
⊤). By Plenitude is exists a Z of type t → t such that ∀pRp(Zp): i.e. Zp = p
whenever p is true andZp = ⊤whenever p is false. Thus the proposition ∀pZp, that
everything isZ, is true. Moreover this proposition entailsZp for every proposition
p, and thus entails p whenever p is true; so it is a true atom.
We can also prove a variant of Proposition 2.14 inwhich Booolean Completeness
is strengthened to Rigid Comprehension, while□ND is weakened to ND:
48SupposeR of type →t→t is functional. LetFR ∶ (→t)→t be X→t.∀y∀p(Ryp→ Xy ≤ p).By Boolean Completeness, FR has a least upper bound: an operation GR ∶  → t such that (i)whenever FRX, X ≤→t GR, and (ii) whenever ∀X(FRX → X ≤ Y ), GR ≤ Y . We will showthat for any given a, Ra(GRa), so that GR witnesses the truth of Plenitude. Fix a, and let pa be theproposition such that Rapa, so we want to show that pa = GRa.We first show that pa ≤ GRa. LetHa ∶ → t be x.x = a∧pa. By ND, ∀x(x ≠ a → (Hax = ⊥)),and hence ∀xp((x ≠ a ∧ Rxp) → (Hax ≤ p)); meanwhileHaa = pa, and so ∀xp((x = a ∧ Rxp) →
(Hax ≤ p)). Putting these facts together, we have that ∀xp(Rxp→ (Hax ≤ p)), i.e. FRHa. SinceGRis the GLB of all the FR operations, we can conclude thatHa ≤ GR, and hence pa = Haa ≤ GRa.It remains to show thatGRa ≤ pa. Let Ja ∶ → t be x.x ≠ a∨pa. By ND, ∀x(x ≠ a→ (x ≠ a =






Figure 6. Between C5 and Extensionalism
Proposition 2.16. Rigid Comprehension and ND jointly imply Plenitude.49
The results we have proven imply that as regards views about the five principles
that took centre stage in this and the previous section, there are just two combin-
ations strictly between C5 and Extensionalism, namely C5 + Actuality (= C5 +
Boolean Completeness = C5 + Rigid Comprehension = C5 + Plenitude), and the
stronger C5+Atomicity (= C5 + □Actuality = C5 + □Boolean Completeness =
C5 +□Rigid Comprehension = C+□Plenitude). Appendix D shows that all these
inclusions are strict, so the map is as in Figure 6.
For systems not including C5, by contrast, the map of possible combinations of
principles is far more complicated. We have not been able to identify any interesting
logical relationships between the principles discussed above (and their negations and
necessitations) other than those just established. Appendix D establishes the con-
sistency of some of these packages, but falls short of a truly systematic exploration
of the rather large set of possible distributions of the statuses of necessary truth,
contingent truth, contingent falsity, and necessary falsity over the above principles
whose consistency is not ruled out by the results of this section. We are hopeful that
the model-theoretic techniques introduced in this appendix will also be useful for
establishing the consistency of some other combinations.
49Suppose that R is a functional relation of type → t→ t. (The general case for type  → → t
is analogous.) Let R∗ be a rigid relation coextensive with R, and let Z be y .∀p.R∗yp → p.
Suppose Rxq. Then R∗xq, so □R∗xq by the persistence of R∗, hence q = R∗xq → q. But then
by Instantiation, Zx ≤ R∗xq → q; so Zx ≤ q. Also, since R∗ is coextensive with the functional
R, ∀pp′(R∗pp′ → (p ≠ x ∨ p′ = q)). By ND (and the necessity of identity), ∀pp′(R∗pp′ → □(p ≠
x ∨ p′ = q)); by the inextensibility of R∗, this implies □∀pp′(R∗pp′ → (p ≠ x ∨ p′ = q)), hence
□(q → ∀p(R∗xp→ p)), i.e. q ≤ fx. Hence q = Zx, so Rx(Zx).
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2.4 Strengthenings in the direction of fineness: Maximalist Classicism
Extensionalism is intuitively an extremely coarse-grained view in higher-order lo-
gic. Indeed, if we say that a theory is coarser-grained than another just in case the
former contains every identity claim (i.e. every closed sentence of the form A = B)
the latter contains, and the latter contains every distinctness claim (i.e. sentence of
the form A ≠ B) the former contains, then Extensionalism can correctly be charac-
terized as a maximally coarse-grained theory. In Extensionalism A = B is equival-
ent to (A = B) ≠ ⊥ and A ≠ B is equivalent to (A ≠ B) = ⊤, so every identity
is equivalent to a distinctness claim, and every distinctness claim is equivalent to
an identity. You cannot consistently add a new identity without also adding a dis-
tinctness claim, and you cannot subtract a distinctness claim without also subtract-
ing an identity claim (since that identity claim entails the distinctness claim in H).
However, Extensionalism is not in this sense the unique maximally coarse-grained
extension of Classicism, since the above reasoning applies to any strengthening of
Extensionalism.50
It’s also worth exploring extensions of Classicism that are more fine-grained
than it. Indeed, one might wonder if there are maximally fine-grained extensions of
C. The answer turns out to be: yes. In fact, by contrast with the case of coarse-
grainedness, there’s an extension of C at least as fine-grained as each and every
consistent extension of C. The weakest such theory we callMaximalist Classicism.
It is the result of extending C with every closed distinctness claim that is consist-
ent with C. Clearly, so long as Maximalist Classicism is consistent, it’s at least as
fine-grained as any consistent extension of C. What’s not obvious is that Maxim-
alist Classicism is consistent, i.e. that the set of closed distinctness claims that are
individually consistent with C are jointly consistent with C. After all, this isn’t true
with identity claims: C is consistent both with the proposition that there is exactly
one object being identical to ⊤ and with it being identical to ⊥. The proof of the
consistency of Maximalist Classicism is a central application of the model theoretic
techniques discussed in the next section.
Maximalist Classicism isn’t a recursively axiomatizable theory.51 But if we don’t
mind talking about axiom schemas whose instances aren’t recursively enumerable,
we can obviously axiomatize Maximalist Classicism by the schema:
Distinctness A ≠ B, where A = B is closed and not a theorem of Classicism.
Or, equivalently, we could use the schema:
50E.g. by adding the claim that there are exactly three things of type e.
51If it were, C would have to be decidable, since we could enumerate the non-theorems of C by
enumerating the theorems of Maximalist Classicism of the form◊¬A, and stripping off the◊¬. But
C is not decidable, for the same reason first-order logic is not.
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Possibility ◊A, where A is closed and consistent with Classicism.
The failure of Maximalist Classicism to be recursively axiomatizable makes it quite
hard to apply theoretical considerations such as simplicity to it. On the one hand, in
one sense of ‘simplicity’, such theories might be considered very unsimple. On the
other hand, we have given an extremely simple characterization of it, as the max-
imally fine-grained extension of Classicism. At any rate, it occupies an important
position in the space of extensions of Classicism that makes it eminently worthy of
serious engagement.52
While these two schemas are obviously equivalent given Classicism, thinking
of the view in terms of Distinctness is perhaps more effective for bringing out its
appeal: the thought is that when it comes to question of identity—at least questions
that can be formulated as closed sentences of higher-order logic—there are no sur-
prises. It would be suprising if, for instance, the proposition that there are three
individuals were the same as the proposition that there are four individuals; Dis-
tinctness, by contrast, ensures the only true identities are those forced on us by logic
(i.e. Classicism). Any such further identities would reflect an aspect of the natures
of the logical constants, and the way that they fit together, that standard classical lo-
gic tells us nothing about. By contrast, Distinctness can be thought of as saying that
all there is to the natures of the logical constants are their logical roles, as captured
in the usual logical rules (i.e. those of H).
Maximalist Classicism feels more tendentious when stated in terms of Possib-
ility. Given our earlier results about the non-theorems of Classicism, instances of
Possibility include the broad possibility of Functionality, Boolean Completeness,
the Fregean Axiom, and so on, as well as their negations. They also include the
broad possibility of many claims we have not discussed, such as higher-order ver-
sions of contentious set theoretic principles, like the axiom of choice and the con-
tinuum hypothesis. This will feel alien to many metaphysicians, who are used to
thinking that when it comes to claims that are sufficiently general, whatever is true
52Those who like the impulse behind Maximalist Classicism should be interested in the pro-
ject of finding strong axiomatizable fragments of Maximalist Classicism. One strategy is to pick
some way of encoding “‘P ” is consistent in C’ as a sentence of higher-orderese, Con(⌜P⌝), in which
case one can formula a decidable axiom-schema Con(⌜P⌝) → ◊P (where P is closed). One can
then derive any instance of Possibility from the corresponding consistency assumption. By Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem, this will never be a consequence of C, but it will often be derivable
from further well-motivated claims. One such well-motivated claim is ◊∃Re→e→t.ZFC(R), where
ZFC(∈) is the conjunction of the nine axioms of second-order ZFC. Notice that this claim is also an
instance of Possibility, assuming ZFC(∈) is consistent. The theory comprising this claim together
with the aforementioned schema can prove everything that can be proved in ZFC to be in Maximalist
Classicism. So in practice there isn’t much difference between being “committed to” Maximalist
Classicism and being “committed to” this particular fragment.
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is necessarily true and whatever is false is necessarily false. But of course, pro-
ponents of Maximalist Classicism could accept this impulse as far as metaphysical
possibility is concerned, in which case they should take this to be another reason
to deny that metaphysical necessity is identical to broad necessity. There’s another
way of talking that metaphysicians often slip into that fits fairly naturally with Max-
imalist Classicism, namely working with an operator ‘it is logically necessary that’,
or ‘it is logically possible that’, in a way that takes for granted that you can go back
and forth between the metalinguistic status of logical truth for sentences, and ob-
ject language formulations in terms of operators. Although there is a lot about this
practice to be suspicious of (see Bacon 2018b, ch.4.), that fact that Maximalist Clas-
sicism is consistent means that there is a real vision in the vicinity that isn’t merely
a use-mention fallacy.
Maximalist Classicism belongs to a broader family of theories in a similar spirit.
For any theory T in higher order logic, we can define the maximization of T to be
the result of adding to it all closed sentences A ≠ B which are consistent with T .
Many theories other than C have consistent maximalizations, which offer interest-
ing alternatives to Maximalist Classicism.53 For example, we could consider the
maximalist versions of the results of adding various combinations of the principles
considered in sections 2.1 and 2.2 to C, or the maximalizations of theories weaker
than C such as H. So long as T can prove that □ has a reasonable modal logic in-
cluding the necessity of identity, its maximalization will be equivalent to the result
of adding ◊P for every closed P consistent with T , and will thus support the naïve
practice of talking about “logical necessity” as an operator in the same way as Max-
imalist Classicism. However, not all theories have consistent maximalizations. For
example the maximalization of C5 is inconsistent, since for many choices ofA—for
example ‘there are exactly three individuals’—C5 entails A = ⊤ ∨ (¬A) = ⊤ but
does not entail either of its disjuncts, so that its maximalization entails both their
negations.54 Much of what we say about Maximalist Classicism below will also
apply to these alternative maximalized theories.
2.5 Maximalist Classicism and non-logical constants
So far we have been talking about Maximalist Classicism as a theory in the purely
logical signature. There is an analogue of this theory for any way of extending
53Fritz, Lederman and Uzquiano (forthcoming) prove the consistency of, the maximalizations of
H0 (see note 7) and H.54The property of having a consistent maximilization is related to the property of coherence in
modal logics (see Meyer 1971), and is studied more generally in the context of higher-order theories
in Bacon Bacon n.d.(a). In E we’ll discuss a construction that can be used to show the consistency
of maximizations of several extensions of C.
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the signature by adding non-logical constants. But for many choices of non-logical
constants, such a view seems deeply implausible. For example, if the signature in-
cludes predicates ‘bachelor’ and ‘married’, then the version of Possibility for that
signature will include the claim that it’s broadly possible that some bachelor is mar-
ried, i.e. ◊∃x.Bachelor x ∧ Married x). And if it also has a constant meaning
‘man’, then the version of Distinctness for that signature will also have the claim
that it is not the case that to be a bachelor is not to be an unmarried man—i.e.
Bachelor ≠ (x.Man(x) ∧¬Married(x)). This seems misguided to us—surely nat-
ural languages very often provide us with simple expressions that refer to entities
that can also be referred to with more complex expressions.55
However, there is considerable attraction to the idea that if all of the nonlogical
constants in some signature denoted distinct fundamental entities, then the version
of Maximalist Classicism for that signature would be true. When formulated in
a fundamental language like this, the resulting principle imposes substantive con-
straints on the fundamental entities denoted by constants of that language: that any
‘logically consistent’ thing we can say about them in this language correspond to a
way for them to broadly possibly be (see also the principle LC from Bacon 2020).
The thought that fundamental entities are in some demanding sense “independent”
of one another has been a guiding idea for a broad range of theorists, especially in
the “Humean” tradition. Some ways of cashing out this vision take us extremely
close to the Logical Maximalist point of view: for example, Dorr and Hawthorne
2013 discuss a view they call ‘combinatorialism’, according to which “in an ap-
propriate language in which all predicates express perfectly natural properties, the
only sentences that express metaphysically necessary propositions are the logical
truths”. While the meaning of ‘logical truth’ here is up for grabs, being a theorem
of Classicism certainly looks like a principled way of filling in the idea, and one
that answers to the Humean impulse that generates it.56 Of course, even those who
55There is a radical view worth engaging with that denies all higher-order identity claims where
the terms flanking the identity symbol are closed and structurally non-isomorphic. But this view also
denies many of the theorems of Classicism, and so is not relevant in the present context.
56An alternative interpretation of the slogan would cash out “logical truth” in the manner of Wil-
liamson (2013) (derived from Tarski 1959 and Bolzano 2004), such that logical truth coincides with
plain truth when it comes to closed sentences involving only logical vocabulary. That interpretation
suggests a schema weaker than Possibility:
(*) ∃x⃗.A→ ◊A[a⃗∕x⃗]
where A is a formula with no nonlogical constants and only the variables x⃗ free, a⃗ is a list of distinct
constants, and A[a⃗∕x⃗] is the result of substituting them for the variables in A. This schema, unlike
Possibility, is consistent withNo Pure Contingency (see §2.2). The combination of these two schemas
is equivalent to the result of strengthening the → in (*) to a ↔: this is the schema Bacon (2020)
calls ‘Logical Necessity’. Note that much of the exploration in that paper concerns consequences of
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vehemently reject this sort of combinatorialist thinking so far as metaphysical ne-
cessity is concerned might still accept it for broad necessity. Indeed, expressions of
anti-Humeanism often slip into assuming something like Maximalist Classicism, by
treating failures of the metaphysical-possibility version of Possibility as establishing
that metaphysical possibility is a more demanding status than “logical possibility”
(see, e.g., Wilson 2010).
Maximalist Classicism in a given signature is equivalent to the combination of
“PureMaximalist Classicism”—i.e. the result of adding all instances of Distinctness
involving only logical constants to Classicism in the signature—with the following
schema (from Bacon 2020):
Separated Structure Fa = Ga → F = G, where a is a non-logical constant and
F and G are closed terms not including a.
Even by itself, Separated Structure is completely implausible for languages with
arbitrary non-logical constants. But with the assumption that the non-logical con-
stants denote distinct fundamental entities, it is an appealing principle in its own
right, even to those that reject not only Maximalist Classicism, but Classicism. It
can be thought of as offering an important grain of truth in the ‘structured’ picture
of propositions shown to be inconsistent by the Russell-Myhill paradox (see Dorr
2016, §6, Goodman 2017).
To see that Separated Structure follows from Maximalist Classicism in a given
signature, note that since C is closed under uniform substitution, if Fa = Ga is a
theorem of C so is Fx = Gx, and hence also F = G by  .57 If Fa = Ga is not
a theorem of C, then its negation, and hence also the conditional, is a theorem of
Maximalist Classicism. To see that Maximalist Classicism (for a given signature)
follows from Pure Maximalist Classicism and Separated Structure, we can begin by
showing Separated Structure to be equivalent to the schema
Fa1...an = Ga1...an → F = G
where F and G are closed and contain no non-logical constants, and a1...an aredistinct non-logical constants. This can be shown by an obvious induction on the
number of nonlogical constants in F and G. So, suppose that A ≠ B is consistent
with C. Enumerating the non-logical constants in A and B as a1...an, we can, using
 show that A = Fa1...an and B = Ga1...an for some closed pure terms F and
the direction of Logical Combinatorialism equivalent to (*) above, which follows from Maximalist
Classicism; indeed most of the paper concerns the more abstract feature of “stablility” which is
common to Maximalist Classicism and Logical Combinatorialism.
57The fact that a doesn’t appear in F or G is crucial here, since only in that case is Fa[x∕a] the
same as Fx, and similarly for G.
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G. F ≠ G must also be consistent with C, so Pure Maximalist Classicism implies
F ≠ G. Hence by the above equivalent of Separated Structure, A = Fa1...an ≠
Ga1...an = B.Note that the above reasoning applies equally well to maximizations of many
other theories. So long as T is closed under uniform substitution and  , the maxim-
ization of T will be equivalent to the conjunction of the purely logical instances of
Distinctness (or Possibility) and Separated Structure.58
The conviction that certain specific properties, relations, and objects are funda-
mental might motivate someone to acceptMaximalist Classicism for a signature that
includes constants for those entities. Disagreements about which entities are fun-
damental will lead to disagreements about which instances of Possibility to accept,
but those sympathetic to the Humean idea can at least agree that, whatever language
turns out to be fundamental, all instances of Possibility will be true in that language.
Rather than formulate the idea in this metalinguistic way, we could introduce
predicates into object language for talking about the status of fundamentality itself,







In this language, we can capture the combinatorialist thought with the following
schema:
Fundamental Possibility Fun x⃗→ ◊P , where P is any formula containing only
logical constants consistent with Classicism all of whose free variables are
among x⃗.59
One noteworthy consequence of Fundamental Possibility is that the denotations of
58The Logical Necessity schema from Bacon 2020, for a given signature, is by this general sort
of argument, equivalent to the conjunction of Separated Structure and No Pure Contingency. Thus
while the two views both offer precisifications of the Humean combinatorialist vision concerning
the fundamental entities, they are as different as could be concerning the purely logical claims, for
according to the former view there is no contingency in that domain.
59One worrisome consequence of Fundamental Possibility is that if a binary relation is funda-
mental, its converse is not fundamental. Since the formula r ≠ (xy.ryx) ∧ s ≠ (xy.ryx) is consist-
ent in C,
Fun r ∧ Fun s ∧ (r ≠ s)→ ◊(r ≠ (xy.ryx) ∧ s ≠ (xy.ryx))
is an instance of Fundamental Possibility. By the necessity of identity, the ◊ is redundant in the
consequent, and the entire formula is in fact equivalent to
Fun r→ ¬Fun(xy.ryx)
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the logical constants are not themselves fundamental: for example, since the formula
∃p.p ∧ Xp is consistent in C, an instance of Fundamental Possibility is FunX →
◊∃p.p ∧ Xp. Instantiating X with ¬ gives Fun¬ → ◊∃p.p ∧ ¬p, which implies
¬Fun(¬) given C. The vision thus stands in contrast with the kind of account we
find in Sider (2011), where certain logical constants are supposed to have exactly the
same fundamentality-theoretic status as, e.g., certain predicates needed for physics.
The maximalist picture goes more naturally with the kind of vision we find in Bacon
2020 and Dorr 2016, on which there is a different but also metaphysically important
status of ‘Purity’ (or ‘Logicality’), which the denotations of closed terms containing
only logical constants all have, but nothing fundamental has.
2.6 Extensions of Maximalist Classicism
Although Maximalist Classicism is maximally fine-grained in our technical sense,
it is far from being maximally strong. In this section we will mention various ex-
tensions of it that strike us as interesting and attractive, although we have almost no
proofs of consistency.
First: we could consider adding some of the further principles discussed in
sections 2.1 and 2.2 to Maximalist Classicism. (This is different from adding the
principles and then maximizing, which also yields interesting theories.) Clearly
we cannot consistently add ND, since for any closed A and B such that A ≠ B
and A = B are both consistent in Classicism, Maximalist Classicism implies A ≠
B∧◊(A = B). Nor can we add the necessitations of any of the other principles. But
for all this tells us, we might be able to consistently add the non-necessitated BF,
Boolean Completeness, Actuality, Atomicity, or Rigid Comprehension principles.
In fact Zach Goodsell (p.c.) has shown that Rigid Comprehension is inconsistent
with Maximalist Classicism; the consistency of the other combinations remains to
be explored.
Second: consider the following scenario, which is compatible with Maximalist
Classicism. There are two magic individuals a and b such that a ≠ b entails every
true proposition. All kinds of divergences from actuality are broadly possible, but
in order to diverge in any other way the first thing we have to do is to identify a
This consequence is rather alarming: it conflicts with the plausible idea that a relation and its converse
are ‘metaphysically on a par’. Bacon (n.d.[b]) takes this to suggest we should eschew the ideology of
‘fundamentality’, and instead theorize in terms of a polyadic notion of ‘cofundamentality’. Altern-
atively, we can weaken Fundamental Possibility in such a way as to avoid it, by strengthening the
definition of Fun(v⃗) to include, alongside the conjuncts expressing the distinctness of distinct vi (ofthe same type), further conjuncts requiring other kinds of “logical independence” among distinct vi,including vi ≠ (xy.vjyx) when vi and vj are of type  →  → . (Dorr (2016, §9) suggests, ina non-Classicist setting, a picture of fundamentality on which fundamental entities come in clusters
related by certain kinds of “interdefinability” operations.)
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and b. This doesn’t feel very much in keeping with the “combinatorialist” spirit that
motivates Maximalist Classicism, so it’s natural to look for strengthenings that rule
it out.





xi ≠ xj)→ ◊P
where P has only free variables x⃗, all of type e.60 This seems attractive, at least
on some ways of thinking about what’s special about type e. The proof we give of
the consistency of Possibility extends easily to Possibility+— indeed it shows that
Possibility is consistent with there being only one individual.
But it doesn’t go as far as we might like since it is consistent with the same a ≠ b
phenomenon arising in, e.g., type e→ t.
For a different kind of strengthening, let’s say that a proposition is ≠-necessary
just in case it is entailed by the possibility of each truth:
□≠ ≔ p.∃q.q ∧□(◊q → p)
Dorr, Hawthorne and Yli-Vakkuri (n.d., appendix D) show that ND holds (in every
type) for □≠, and moreover that on a natural definition of “ND-respecting modaloperation”,□≠ is equivalent to having every ND-respecting modal operation: intu-itively,□≠ is the minimal restriction of□ compatible with imposing ND. So we cancapture the idea that lots of things can happen without any distinct entities of any
type having to become identical with a schema with instances of the form ◊≠P forsome wide range of values of P . The most obvious idea would be to strenthen Pos-
sibility by replacing◊with◊≠. But this is clearly inconsistent: the Fregean Axiom,according to which there are only two propositions, is consistent with Classicism,
but ◊≠(Fregean Axiom) implies the Fregean Axiom, since if there were three dis-tinct propositions p, q, r, p ≠ q ∧ p ≠ r ∧ q ≠ r would be a □≠ truth incompatiblewith the Fregean Axiom. More generally, whenever some closed P is consistent
with Classicism but not with Maximalist Classicism, ◊≠P will also be inconsistentwith Maximalist Classicism. So the furthest we could hope to go in this direction
consistent with Maximalist Classicism is the following schema:
Strong Possibility ◊≠P , where P is closed and consistent with Maximalist Clas-sicism.
Note that adding Strong Possibility to Classicism makes Possibility redundant. For
60This is tantamount to saying ‘Everything of type e is fundamental’.
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if P is consistent with Maximalist Classicism, ◊P is too, so ◊≠◊P is an instanceof Strong Possibility; but ◊≠◊P implies ◊◊P and hence ◊P .We do not know whether Strong Possibility is consistent.
3 Model theory for Classicism
In studying systems of higher-order logic, including Classicism, model theory is a
crucial tool. Amodel for a certain higher-order language is amathematical construct
according to which we can assign “denotations” to the terms of that language, and
ultimately truth values to its formulas. A class of models, , is sound for a logic, T
(understood as a set of formulae), just in case every member of T is true in every
model in , and complete for T just in case every formula true in every model in 
is in T . Soundness theorems are particularly useful for proving consistency results,
but the enterprise also has considerable heuristic value in generating intuitions about
the metaphysical worldviews these theories are describing.
Our guiding idea in the search for a useful notion of model for Classicism will
be a deep parallel between Extensionalism and Classicism. We began to notice this
already in §1.4 where we saw that, where Extensionalism could be axiomatized
by certain material conditionals (The Fregean Axiom + Functionality, Extension-
ality, etc), turning those material conditionals into rules of proof delivered parallel
characterizations of Classicism. Our model theory will be based on similar paral-
lels. In model theoretic terms, a material conditional corresponds to an inference
rule preserving truth over a single model, and a rule of proof to the preservation of
truth-in-all-models from a certain class, or ‘category’ of models. First we present
a general model theory for H and see that models of this sort satisfying a certain
natural “extensionality” condition characterize Extensionalism. Models that satisfy
this condition can be simplified into a familiar form due to Henkin. Then we look at
categories of models of H and formulate a condition on such categories which we
call “intensionality”, which is in a natural sense a generalization of to the extension-
ality condition on single models, and corresponds to rule form of the Extensionality
axiom. With this condition in hand, we can similarly define a simpler class of mod-
els that stands to Classicism as Henkin models stand to Extensionalism. In §3.5 and
§3.6 we will construct some simple examples of these “action models”, use them to
verify some of the consistency claims we made in part 3.5, and explain how they
relate to and generalize existing notions of model for Classicism.
3.1 BBK-models
Benzmüller, Brown and Kohlhase (2004) provide a concept of model that they show
to be sound and complete forH. We will need a few preliminary definitions. A typed
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collection C is a function that maps each type  to a nonempty set C. When C and
D are typed collections, amapping from C toD is a function ℎ that maps each type
 to a function ℎ from C toD. A variable assignment g for a typed collection C
is a mapping to C from some typed collection of variables; a variable assignment is
adequate for a term if it is defined on all variables free in that term. Amodel consists
of (i) a domain,M, for each type , from which the interpretations of terms of that
type are drawn and the quantifiers of that type range, (ii) an interpretation function
J⋅K⋅ mapping terms to their interpretations relative to variable assignments, and (iii)
a device for determining which elements ofMt (the propositions) are true or false:
Definition. A BBK-model for  is a tripleM = ⟨M⋅, J⋅K⋅M, valM⟩, where:
(i) M⋅ is a typed collection.
(ii) J⋅K⋅M is a function that maps each type- term A of  and variable assign-ment g for M⋅ that is adequate for A to an element JAKg of M , subject to
the following constraints:
a. JvKg = g(v)
b. If JAKg = JCKℎ and JBKg = JDKℎ then JABKg = JCDKℎ.
c. JAKg = JAKℎ when g and ℎ agree on all variables free in A.
d. JAKg = JBKg when A and B are -equivalent.61
(iii) valM (the ‘valuation’) is a function fromMt to {0, 1}, subject to the follow-ing constraints, where ‘M, g ⊩ P ’ means ‘valMJP KgM = 1’:
a. M, g ⊩ ¬P iffM, g ⊮ P .
b. M, g ⊩ P ∧Q iffM, g ⊩ P andM, g ⊩ Q.
c. M, g ⊩ P ∨Q iffM, g ⊩ P orM, g ⊩ Q.
d. M, g ⊩ ∀F iffM, g[v↦ a] ⊩ Fv for every a ∈ A (v not free in
F ).
e. M, g ⊩ ∃F iff M, g[y ↦ a] ⊩ Fv for some a ∈ A (v not free in
F ).
f. M, g ⊩ A = B iff JAKgM = JBKgM.62
61In the most general notion of model explored in Benzmüller, Brown and Kohlhase 2004,  isn’t
baked in. And indeed, one could even be more general by dropping the requirement that of  if one
wanted models of logics not including , as Muskens (2007) does.
62Given clause (ii.b), we only need the special cases of these conditions where P , Q, F , A, and
B are variables.
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Note that by clause (ii-c), JAKg is independent of g when A is closed; in this case
we just write JAK. P holds in M iff M, g ⊩ P for all g adequate for P ; the theory
of a class of models is the set of all formulae that hold in all of them.
The point of these definitions arises from the following key theorem:
Theorem 3.1. The class of BBK-models is sound and complete for H: for any sig-
nature , every theorem of H holds in every BBK-model, and every set of sentences
consistent in H holds in some BBK-model. Moreover, if  is countable, all of the
above is true for models in which each domainM is a subset of some given count-
able set, say ℕ.
We sketch the proof of this in a footnote.63
Theorem 3.1 automatically yields soundness and completeness theorems for all
manner of theories extendingH: whenever T extendsH, the class of all BBK-models
of T is sound and complete for T . This is not the most useful sort of soundness
and completeness result, since the definition of BBK-model does not suggest any
methods for constructing BBK-models. However, these automatic soundness and
completeness theorems can provide the basis for more useful soundness and com-
pleteness theorems where the models are characterized in a more intrinsic, concrete,
compositional way. Our goal is to do this for Classicism. But wewill begin by seeing
63Soundness is routine. To show that it’s complete, we must first show that anyH-consistent set of
formulae T in a given  can be extended to a consistent set of formulae T + in an expanded language
+ that adds new constants to , where T + is both negation complete (¬A ∈ T + whenever A ∉ T +)
and witness-complete (whenever ∃F ∈ T +, Fc ∈ T + for some constant c). The proof of this fact,
“Henkin’s Lemma”, is exactly the same as the corresponding proof for first-order logic — indeed
the original version of this result by Henkin (1950) was in a higher order setting. Given a consistent,
negation-complete, witness-complete T +, we form aBBK-modelMT+ for as follows. Each domain
MT+ is the set of equivalence classes of closed type- terms of + under the equivalence relation
≈T+ , where A ≈T+ B iff T + ⊢ A = B. JAKgMT+ is the equivalence class of all the closed terms thatcan be derived from A by replacing every free occurrence in A of any variable v with any member
of gv (an equivalence class of closed terms). And for p ∈ MtT+ , valMT+ (p) = 1 iff P ∈ T forany (or equivalently, all) P ∈ p. It is then a straightforward matter to show that MT+ is indeed aBBK-model in which every member of T holds. The properties of substitution secure that J⋅K⋅MT+meets constraints (ii-a–c), while the fact that T + is closed under -equivalences secures (ii-d). The
consistency and negation-completeness of T + and the PC-rules for ∧ and ∨ guarantee that valMT+ iswell/behaved with respect to ¬, ∧, and ∨; the witness/completeness of T + takes care of one direction
of the biconditionals for ∀ and ∃; the fact that T + contains every instance of UI and EG takes care of
the other directions; finally the fact that T + contains Ref and LL yield the biconditional for =. Note
that if  is countable, we can set things up so that + is also countable, in which case the domain of
MT+ in each type is countable as well.The proof in Benzmüller, Brown and Kohlhase 2004 establishes the completeness of BBK-models
for a certain cut free sequent calculus, which requires a proof substantially more complicated than
the proof we have sketched here, which is essentially due to Henkin (1950).
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how it can be done for the much stronger theory Extensionalism (see §1.4), which
will provide a helpful starting point for the generalization to Classicism. To get a
better sense of the distinctive properties of BBK-models of Extensionalism, we can
introduce some salient structural operations on, and properties of, BBK-models.
Certain elements of a BBK model can be associated with functions determined
by how those elements apply to their arguments, and with extensions determined by
the truth values of the results of those applications. These notions let us distinguish
some special classes of BBK models: the functional and functionally full models,
and the extensional and extensionally full models.
Definition. WhereM is a BBK-model:
• The applicative behaviour, appM d, of an element d ∈ M→ , is the function
a ↦ JXyK[X↦d,y↦a].64
• The extension, extM d, of an element d ∈M1→⋯→n→t is the set
{⟨a1,… , an⟩ ∈M1 ×⋯ ×Mn ∣M, [X ↦ d, yi ↦ ai] ⊩ Xy⃗}
Using these concepts, we can pick out certain special classes of BBK-models:
Definition. A BBK-modelM is:
• functional iff its applicative behaviour functions are injective for all , : that
is, whenever d ≠ d′, there is some a ∈M such that appd(a) ≠ appd′(a).
• extensional iff its extension functions are injective: whenever ext a = ext b,
a = b.
• Fregean iff val is injective. In other words, the domain of type t has exactly
two elements.65
These three principles bear a special relationship to the Functionality schema (∀z(Xz =
Y z) → X = Y ), Extensionality schema (∀z⃗(Xz⃗ ↔ Y z⃗) → X = Y ), and the Fre-
gean Axiom ((p ↔ q) → p = q): a model is functional (extensional, Fregean) iff
all instances of the Functionality schema (Extensionality schema, The Fregean Ax-
iom) hold in it. See §1.4 for discussion of these principles. Extensionality is thus
equivalent to the combination of functionality and Fregeanness. As a consequence
of Theorem 3.1, we have:
64By clauses (ii-b) and (ii-c), it doesn’t matter which variables we pick to beX and y. Benzmüller,
Brown and Kohlhase (2004) treat the application map to be a separate ingredient in the definition of
“model”, but since it can be recovered from J⋅K we omit it.
65It can’t have less than two elements since no element of type t can have the same truth value as
its negation.
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Theorem 3.2. The class of extensional BBK-models is sound and complete for Ex-
tensionalism.
It is also interesting to think about BBK-models in which the applicative or ex-
tension maps are surjective. A modelM is:
• functionally full iff each appM is surjective on each domain: every functionfrom M toM is the applicative behaviour of some element ofM→ .
• extensionally full iff extM is surjective on each domain: every subset X of
M1 ×⋯ ×Mnis the extension of some d ∈M1→⋯→n→t.
Functional fullness implies, though it is not implied by, extensional fullness. Ana-
logous to the ways in which the Extensionality and Functionality schemas character-
ise the eponymous properties of BBK-models, one might hope to find some axioms
which characterise functional or extensional fullness. But this is not so: Gödel’s
first incompleteness theorem implies that neither of the properties is captured by
any recursively enumerable axiom-scheme. (For a bit more detail see Dorr 2016,
n. 106.)
3.2 Henkin models
Every functional and Fregean (i.e., extensional) BBK-model is equivalent to a model
where the elements of a given functional type are simply identical to their applicative
behaviours, and the elements of propositional type are simply identical to their truth
values. The operation of turning certain kinds of models into more “concrete” ones
will be important later in analogous settings, so we shall present it in some detail.
The relevant concrete models are known as Henkinmodels, (after Henkin 1950). In
a Henkin modelH, He can still be any set, butHt must be {0, 1}, andH→ must be
some subset of (H)H .
Working with this more concrete kind of model has one very significant advant-
age. BBK-models that are not concrete have few practical uses because they are not
constructed compositionally from the interpretations of the non-logical constants;
J⋅K is a function defined on all terms of the language and have to satisfy some highly
non-trivial constraints. By contrast, to specify a Henkin model one only need to
specify the interpretation of the non-logical constants, and provided they exist, this
interpretation extends uniquely to an interpretation of all the terms. However, we do
need to ensure that the domains are sufficiently full that we will be able to provide
an appropriate interpretation for every term relative to every variable assignment.
To capture this, we first define a notion of premodel whose domains need not be
sufficiently full; then recursively define a partial interpretation function for any pre-
model; and finally define a model to be a premodel whose interpretation function is
full. Spelling this out, we get the following.
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Definition. (i) AHenkin premodel for a signature is an ordered pairH = ⟨H⋅,⟩,
where Ht = {0, 1} and H→ ⊆ (H)H , and  is a mapping that takes each nonlo-
gical constant c of type  to an element of H .
(ii) When H is a Henkin premodel for , J⋅K⋅H is the partial function that takes atype- term A and a A-adequate assignment function g for H⋅ to something of the
right sort to be in H , in accordance with the following clauses:
JABKg = JAKg(JBKg) Jv.AKg = a ↦ JAKg[v↦a]
JcKg = (c) JvKg = g(v)




1 if a = b
0 otherwise
)
J∧Kg = n↦ (m↦ min{n, m}) J∨Kg = n↦ (m↦ max{n, m})
J∀Kg = d ↦ min{d(a) ∣ a ∈ H} J∃Kg = d ↦ max{d(a) ∣ a ∈ H}
(The first clause means that JABKg exists so long as JAKg and JBKg exist, and is in
that case equal to JAKg(JBKg).)
(iii) A Henkin model for  is a Henkin premodel H for  such that JAKgH existsand is in H for every type- term A and assignment function g adequate for A.66
(iv) A formula P holds in H on g—in symbols, H, g ⊢ P—iff JP Kg = 1. P
holds in H iff H, g ⊩ P for every g adequate for P .
Henkin (1950) (as corrected by Andrews 1972) establishes that the class of Hen-
kin models is sound and complete for Extensionalism. To set the stage for our dis-
cussion of Classicism below, we observe that this fact can be derived as a corollary
of Theorem 3.1. The derivation uses the following two results.
Proposition 3.3. EveryHenkinmodel is an extensional BBK-model, with its defined
interpretation function and the identity on {0, 1} as valuation.
Proposition 3.4. For every extensional BBK-model M, there is a Henkin-model
HM in which the same formulae hold.
Verifying Proposition 3.3 boils down to checking that whenA andB are -equivalent
terms, JAKgH = JBKgH whenever defined. For Proposition 3.4, the idea is to construct
66More “intrinsic” ways of expressing this condition are known. For example, it can be shown
(see, e.g. Bacon n.d.[a]) that Henkin premodel H is a Henkin model so long as (i) the domains
are closed under application; (ii) the denotations of the logical constants (as given above) all be-
long to the domain of the appropriate type, and (iii) for any type  and relational types , ,
H(→→)→(→)→→ contains the function S,, ≔ d ↦ b ↦ a ↦ d(a)(b(a)) and H→→contains the function K, ≔ a ↦ b ↦ a.
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each domain HM as the range of an injective function f  on M , where f e is justthe identity; f t is valM; and f → is defined by recursively replacing each element
d with appM d.By Proposition 3.3 and the soundness part of Theorem 3.2, every theorem of
Extensionalism holds in every Henkin model. And by Proposition 3.4 and the com-
pleteness part of Theorem 3.2, every formula consistent with Extensionalism holds
on some assignment in some Henkin model. Thus:
Theorem 3.5. The class of Henkin models is sound and complete for Extensional-
ism.
3.3 Categories of BBK-models
To do for Classicism what Henkin did for Extensionalism, we will consider proper-
ties of collections of BBK-models analogous to the properties of individual BBK-
models that make for the truth of Extensionalism. It will turn out that the properties
of interest are properties not of mere collections of BBK-models but of categories of
BBK-models, i.e. collections of models with a specified collection of homomorph-
isms between them. So, the first thing we will need is an appropriate notion of
homomorphism for BBK-models (for a given signature). As usual in model theory,
a homomorphism is a mapping that preserves interpretations. More carefully, a ho-
momorphism ℎ fromM to N is a typed family of functions ℎ where ℎ ∶M → N




Here, ℎ◦g is the assignment function for N that maps each type- variable v to
ℎ(gv).67
Evidently, the composition of any two homomorphisms is a homomorphism, and
the identity mapping that maps every element of every domain of a model to itself is
a homomorphism from that model to itself. This means that if we take any class of
BBK-models and any class of homomorphisms between those models, so long as the
latter class is closed under composition and contains all the identity homomorph-
isms on the models, they will form a category according to the standard definition:
a class of “objects” (here, the models) and a class of “arrows” (here, the homo-
morphisms) together with a pair of mappings src and trg that assigns each arrow a
67Note that the valuation functions valM and valN play no role in this definition: models that areisomorphic (in the sense that there are mutually inverse homorphisms between them) can thus make
different sentences true. Given this there is a natural sense in which homomorphisms relate what
BBK call “structures” rather than models. Nevertheless, we will think of the source and target of
homomorphisms as models, and indeed take these to be “built in”, so that for each homomorphism,
there is a unique model that is its source and another unique model that is its target.
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unique “source” and “target” object; a mapping ◦ (here, function-composition) that
takes any arrows f and g where the source of g is the target of f to an arrow g◦f
which shares a source with f and a target with g; and a mapping Id that takes every
object A to an arrow 1A with source and target A, such that ℎ◦(g◦f ) = (ℎ◦g)◦f ,
f◦1A = f and 1A◦f = f .Given a BBK-model M and a category  to which it belongs, we can think of
the set of homomorphisms in  with sourceM, which we will callM , as playing a
role similar to that of possible worlds in the standard semantics for modal logic. Any
element ofMt can be assigned not just a truth-value but a “truth value profile”—the
subset of M comprising those homormorphisms that map it to a truth. Likewise,
an element of a relational type can be assigned not just an extension but an inten-
sion which we get by looking at the extensions of the results of transporting it using
the homomorphisms, and each element of a functional type can be assigned an ap-
plicative behaviour profile by looking at the applicative behaviours of the results of
transporting it using the homomorphisms.
Definition. Where  is a category of BBK-models andM is a member of ,
• The applicative behaviour profile appM d of any d ∈ M→ is the functionsuch that for any pair ⟨ℎ, a⟩ where for some N, ℎ ∶M → N and a ∈ N,
appM d⟨ℎ, a⟩ = appN(ℎ
→d)a
• The intension intM d of any d ∈M1→⋯→n→t is the set of all tuples (ℎ, a1,… , an)such that for some N, ℎ ∶M → N and ⟨a1,… , an⟩ ∈ extN(ℎ1→⋯→n→td)
• The truth value profile valM p of any p ∈ Mt is the set of all arrows withsource M that map p to a truth:
⋃
N
{ℎ ∶M → N ∣ valN(ℎtp) = 1}
These notions generalize the analogous operations, app, ext and val, for single BBK-
models in the sense that they end up being equivalent on a category consisting of a
single BBK-model with the identity homomorphism.
We can then consider some special categories of BBK-models in which these
functions are injective.
Definition. A category  of BBK-models is
• quasi-Fregean iff valM is injective for each M in .
• quasi-functional iff appM is injective for each M in .
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• intensional iff intM is injective for each M in .
Informally, the first condition corresponds to the idea that propositions are individu-
ated by their truth-values across modal space, the second to the idea that relations are
individuated by their applicative behaviour across modal space, and the last condi-
tion to the idea that relations are individuated by their extensions acrossmodal space.
These are similarly generalizations of the notions of Fregeanness, functionality, and
extensionality: they coincide in a one-object category with just the identity homo-
morphism. Moreover, in analogy with the discussion of extensional models, we can
see that intensionality is equivalent to the combination of quasi-functionality and
quasi-Fregeanness.68
And as with our discussion of Extensionalism we will see that there is a close
correspondence between these conditions and the rule corresponding to the Fregean
Axiom, Functionality and Extensionality, namely Equiv,  , and Equiv+. This cor-
respondence lets us prove the following key result:
Theorem 3.6. The class of BBK-models that belong to an intensional category of
BBK-models is sound and complete for Classicism.
For the soundness direction, the central observation is that the theory of any
quasi-Fregean category of BBK-models (the set of formulae that hold in all of them)
is closed under Equiv. Intuitively: if P ↔ Q is true on all assignments in every
model in , there’s no way for a homomorphism to pull apart the truth values of the
interpretations of P and Q in a model, which given quasi-Fregeanness means that
denotations must be identical. Likewise, the theory of any quasi-functional category
of BBKmodels is closed under  . For if Fx = Gx is true on all assignments in every
model in , then there is no way for a homomorphism to pull apart the applicative
behaviours of the interpretations of F andG in any model on any assignment, which
given quasi-functionality forces those denotations to be identical.
For the completeness direction, the key fact is that for any theory T closed under
both Equiv and —and hence in particular Classicism—the category of all models
of T and all homomorphisms between these models is quasi-Fregean and quasi-
functional.69
68Quasi-Fregeanness is just the n = 0 special case of intensionality; given quasi-functionality, we
can extend this by induction on n.
69For the Equiv part, suppose we have a modelM of T with p,q ∈Mt such that p ≠ q. Consider
the expanded language M in which every element of M is a constant of type . Let M+ be themodel derived fromM by extending its interpretation function to terms ofM with the new constantsinterpreted as denoting themselves.70 Let T + be the result of adding to T all closed identities in Mthat are true in M+, along with ¬(p ↔ q). T + must be consistent. For if it were inconsistent
there would be a finite collection of identities, A1,… , An in T + inconsistent with ¬(p ↔ q): i.e.
A1 ∧⋯ ∧ An → (p ↔ q) would be a theorem of H, and thus a theorem of T . But since T is closed
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Indeed, we can sharpen the proof of Theorem 3.6 to show that for any infinite
set—e.g. ℕ—the category of BBK-models of Classicism whose domains are all
subsets of this set is also quasi-Fregean and quasi-functional, so we also have a
soundness and completeness theorem for BBK models that belong to categories
that are constrained in this way. Note that, unlike the category of all BBK models
of Classicism, such categories are small — i.e. there is a set of objects and arrows.
This strengthening of Theorem 6 will be useful in the next section.
In §3.1 we also discussed “functional fullness” and “extensional fullness” condi-
tions on models, defined by the surjectiveness of the applicative behaviour mapping
and extension mapping. These also have analogues at the level of categories, but
we need to think a little about what sets it would make sense to require the relevant
functions to be surjective to. For any category of BBK-models  and model M in
, define
• M[1,…,n] to be the powerset of the set of all n+1-tuples ⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩, wherefor some N, ℎ ∶M → N and each ai ∈ Ni .
• M⇒ to be the set of all functions  which take an ordered pair ⟨ℎ, a⟩ such
that for some N, ℎ ∶M → N and a ∈ N, and yield an element of N , and are
“well-behaved” in the following sense: for any ℎ ∶ M → N, i ∶ N → O, and
a ∈ N , ⟨i◦ℎ, ia⟩ = i(⟨ℎ, a⟩).
We can then define a category of  of BBK-models to be:
• quasi-functionally full iff appM is a surjection from eachM→ toM⇒ .
• intensionally full iff intM is a surjection from eachM1→⋯→n→t toM[1,…,n].
To motivate the first of these definitions, note that by the definition of appM, appM dmust always obey thewell-behavedness condition, since homomorphismsmust com-
mute with application.
By contrast with the case of individual BBK-models where the n = 0 case of
extensional fullness is automatically satisfied (since each truth-value is guaranteed to
under the rule of Necessitation, we can derive□A1 ∧⋯∧□An → □(p ↔ q). But since A1,… , Anare identities, they imply their own necessitations, so□(p ↔ q) must be a theorem of T +, and thus
also p = q, which is impossible sinceM+ is a model of T + in which p = q is false. So there must be
a modelN+ of T +, by the completeness theorem for BBK-models. LetN be the model of obtained
by restricting N+’s interpretation function to , and let ℎ be the typed family of functions obtained
by mapping each element a of M+ to JaKN+ , i.e. the interpretation of a (considered as a constant of
M) in N+. It’s easy to see that ℎ is a homomorphism fromM to N. So, as desired, we get a memberof our category and a homomorphism that maps p and q to elements with different truth values.
To finish the proof, we can note that if Modalized Functionality—which can be derived from Equiv
and —holds in a quasi-Fregean category, the category must be quasi-functional.
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be had by some type-t element), the n = 0 case of intensional fullness is non-trivial.
We’ll call a category of BBK-models that satisfies this condition propositionally
full: every set of homomorphisms from a given model M is the truth-value profile
of some element ofMt.71
3.4 Action models
We saw earlier that every extensional BBK-model is isomorphic to a “concrete”
Henkin model, with a compositionally specified interpretation function, in which
propositions are identical to their truth values, and elements of functional type are
identical to their applicative behaviour. Our strategy in this section will be to find
similarly “concrete” and compositionalmodels for each intensional category of BBK-
models, in which propositions are identical to their truth-value profiles (which spe-
cify their truth value under each homomorphism) and elements of functional type
are identical to their applicative behaviour profiles (which specify their applicative
behaviour under each homomorphism). The main upshot of this, apart from intro-
ducing a workable notion of model for proving consistency results, is that we will
be able to transfer our soundness and completeness theorems for intensional cat-
egories of BBK-models to our more concrete models, just as we did for extensional
BBK-models and Henkin models.
Here the key concept we will need in order to carry out this strategy is that of
an action on some category (a.k.a. a functor from that category to Set), which will
play roughly the role of a “domain” that was being played by mere sets in Henkin
models.
Definition. An action on a category  is a function −∗ that associates each objectA
of  with a set A∗, and each arrow ℎ ∶ A → B of  with a function ℎ∗ ∶ A∗ → B∗,
in such a way that
• i∗◦ℎ∗ = (i◦ℎ)∗ for any composable arrows i and ℎ
• when 1A is the identity arrow on A, 1A∗ is the identity function on A∗.
Example. Where  is a category of BBK-models, each type  determines an action
− of applying the superscript to a model or homomorphism respectively:
71The connection between these properties is a little more intricate that in the extensional case.
Whereas functional fullness implied extensional fullness, quasi-functional fullness does not imply
intensional fullness (since the latter does whereas the former does not imply propositional fullness).
However, the conjunction of functional and propositional fullness does imply intensional fullness.
Meanwhile, in intensional categories, intensional fullness coincides with the combination of quasi-
functional and propositional fullness.
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• − takes a modelM in the category to the setM
• − takes a homomorphism ℎ ∶ M → N in the category to the function ℎ ∶
M → N .
As another example, we can treat all possible truth-value profiles as an action:
Example. For any category , the powerset action on  is the action − where for





and for any arrow ℎ ∶ A → B and set of arrows X ∈ A , ℎX is the set of all
arrows with source B which yield a member of X when composed with ℎ, i.e.
⋃
C
{i ∶ B → C ∣ i◦ℎ ∈ X}.
(This is sometimes called the result of ‘dividing’ X by ℎ.)
The truth-value profile of any element ofMt is an element ofM . Moreover, the
action of any homomorphism of BBK-models on the propositional elements induces
an action on their truth-value profiles: the truth-value profile of ℎtp is the set of
homomorphisms i such that it(ℎtp) is true; i.e. the set of i such that i◦ℎ belongs to
the truth-value profile of p. So the induced action of ℎ on a truth-value profile X
can be stated intrinsically in terms of X and is just ℎX as defined above.
We can likewise treat all possible applicative behaviour profiles as an action:
Example. Suppose −∗ and −† are actions on . Then the exponential action is the
action −∗⇒† on  such that:
(i) For every object A, A∗⇒† is the set of all functions  whose domain is the
set of all pairs ⟨ℎ, x⟩, where for some object B, ℎ ∶ A → B and x ∈ B∗;
which map each such ⟨ℎ, x⟩ to a member ofB†; and which are well-behaved
in the sense that i†(⟨ℎ, x⟩) = ⟨i◦ℎ, i∗x⟩ for any ℎ ∶ A → B, i ∶ B → C ,
and x ∈ B∗.
(ii) For every arrow ℎ ∶ A → B, ℎ∗⇒† is the function such that for any  ∈
A∗⇒†, i ∶ B → C , and x ∈ C∗, (ℎ∗⇒†)⟨i, x⟩ = ⟨i◦ℎ, x⟩.
The applicative behaviour profile of any element ofM→ is an element ofM⇒ .
Moreover, the action of any homomorphism of BBK-models on elements of func-
tional type induces an action on their applicative behaviour profiles: the applicative
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behaviour profile of ℎ→d maps ⟨i, a⟩ to i→(ℎ→d)(a). So the induced action of
ℎ on an applicative behaviour profile  can be stated intrinsically in terms of  and
is just ℎ⇒ as defined above.
In general the truth-value profiles ofMt will be a subset ofM and the applicat-
ive behaviour profiles of elements ofM→ a subset ofM⇒ . However, in a category
of BBK-models −t and −→ will determine subactions of − and −⇒ :
Definition. One action −∗ is a subaction of another action −† iff A∗ ⊆ A† for every
object A and ℎ∗(x) = ℎ†(x) for every ℎ ∶ A→ B and x ∈ A∗.
With these concepts under our belt, we can finally introduce the promised ana-
logue of Henkin models for Classicism. As before, we can start with a notion of
premodel; define a partial notion of interpretation for premodels; and then define a
model to be a premodel which is “sufficiently full” in the sense that its interpretation
function is total. Our starting point is a rooted category: an ordered pair ⟨,W0⟩,whereW0 is an object of  with an arrow to every other object of .72
Definition. (i) An action premodel A for a signature  is a tuple ⟨,W0,−⋅,⟩,where ⟨,W0⟩ is any rooted category, and for each type , − is an action of , suchthat:
1. −e is any action of  such thatW e is nonempty for every objectW ;
2. −t is a subaction of − (the powerset action on );
3. −→ is any subaction of −⇒ (the exponential action on  for − and −);
and
4. For each type- nonlogical constant c of , (c) ∈ W 0 .
The notion of interpretation function for an action premodels will be a bit differ-
ent from the interpretation functions we have been working with up to now. These
interpretation functions require not just a term A and an assignment function g, but
an arrow ℎ with sourceW0: g is an assignment function for ℎ’s target.
Definition. When A is an action premodel for , the interpretation function of A
is a partial function J⋅KA that takes an arrow ℎ ∶ W0 → W , a termA of some type ,an assignment function g forW adequate for A, and returns something of the right
sort to belong toW  , such that:
JcKgℎ = ℎ(c)
72Disallowing objects without an arrow from W0 is just a convenience, since they would makeno difference if they were present.
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JvKgℎ = g(v)
J¬Kgℎ = ⟨i,p⟩ ↦
⋃
V
{j ∶ trg(i)→ V } ⧵ p
J∧Kgℎ = ⟨i,p⟩ ↦ (⟨j,q⟩ ↦ j
tp ∩ q)




ℎ = ⟨i, ⟩ ↦
⋃
V
{j ∶ trg(i)→ V ∣ 1V ∈ (j, a) for every a ∈ V }
J∃K
g
ℎ = ⟨i, ⟩ ↦
⋃
V
{j ∶ trg(i)→ V ∣ 1V ∈ (j, a) for some a ∈ V }
J=K
g







Jv.AKgℎ = ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ JAK
(i◦g)[v↦a]
i◦ℎ
For now, wewon’t try to justify these clauses; wewill soon provide away of restating
their essential effect in a more familiar-looking format.73
Definition. An action premodel A is an action model iff for every type- -term
A, arrow ℎ ∶ W0 → V , and assignment g for V adequate for A: JAKgℎ exists andbelongs to V .74
When A is an action model, ℎ ∶ W0 → V and g is an assignment function for
V , formula P holds in A on ℎ, g (A, ℎ, g ⊩ P ) iff 1V ∈ JP Kgℎ. P holds in A on
g (A, g ⊩ P ) iff A, 1W0 , g ⊩ P . P holds in A (A ⊩ P ) iff A, g ⊩ P whenever gis an assignment for W0 adequate for P . P is valid in a class X of action models(X ⊩ P ) iff P holds in every model in X.
Using this notation, we can parlay the interpretations of the logical constants
73One thing to note is that the logical constants all denote functions from ordered pairs that are
indifferent to the identity of its first element (a homomorphism). This is to be expected: in a category
of BBK-models, any homomrphisms ℎ, i ∶ M → N must agree on JcKM for any logical constant c,so appMJcKM⟨ℎ, a⟩ = appMJcKM⟨i, a⟩ for any a in the appropriate domain of N.74Analogous to the fact about Henkin models reported in note 66, we can also give a more “in-
trinsic” version of the sufficient fullness condition: an action premodel A is an action model iff (i)
the domains are closed under application: ⟨1W , a⟩ ∈ W  when  ∈ W → and a ∈ W  ; (ii) thedenotations of all the logical constants (as specified above) all belong to the appropriate domains;
and (iii) for any type , relational types , , and object W , W (→→)→(→)→→ and W →→
respectively contain the following functions:
S,, ≔ ⟨i, ⟩ ↦ ⟨j, ⟩ ↦ ⟨k, a⟩ ↦ ⟨k◦j, a⟩⟨1trg k, ⟨k, a⟩⟩
K, ≔ ⟨i,b⟩ ↦ ⟨j, a⟩ ↦ jb.
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into the following more helpful form. We can show that when A is an action model,
ℎ ∶ W0 → V , g is an assignment for V adequate for the relevant formula, and v isa variable of type :
A, ℎ, g ⊩ ¬P iff A, ℎ, g ⊮ P
A, ℎ, g ⊩ P ∧Q iff A, ℎ, g ⊩ P and A, ℎ, g ⊩ Q
A, ℎ, g ⊩ P ∨Q iff A, ℎ, g ⊩ P or A, ℎ, g ⊩ Q
A, ℎ, g ⊩ ∀v.P iff A, ℎ, g[v↦ a] ⊩ P for all a ∈ V 
A, ℎ, g ⊩ ∃v.P iff A, ℎ, g[v↦ a] ⊩ P for some a ∈ V 
A, ℎ, g ⊩ A = B iff JAKgℎ = JBKgℎ
and in consequence,
A, ℎ, g ⊩ □P iff A, i◦ℎ, i◦g ⊩ P for all i with source V .
The theorem that action models are sound and complete for Classicism is proved
in Appendix C; here we just sketch the main ideas. For the soundness part, the
important fact is
Proposition 3.7. Any action model can be turned into a BBK-model which makes
the same formulae true, and in which every instance of Logical Equivalence is true.
The informal idea is to let the domains at each type  be given by W 0 , the inter-pretation function given by J⋅K⋅1W0 , and valp = 1 iff 1W0 ∈ p. The BBK clauses forthe connectives and quantifiers follow immediately from the above biconditionals
involving⊩; the only non-trivial aspect is showing the  holds.
For the completeness part, the important fact is
Proposition 3.8. For every small, intensional category of BBK-models, andmodel
M0 in  there is an action model AM in which the same formulae hold.
The idea here is that the rooted category of the action model will be ⟨,M0⟩ (if ne-cessary throwing away any models in  without homormorphisms from M0), con-structing the domain of each by (roughly) leaving individuals alone, replacing pro-
positional elements with their truth-value profiles, and iteratively replacing elements
of functional type with their applicative behaviour profiles. Note that we could de-
rive propositions 3.3 and 3.4, relating extensional BBK-models to Henkin models,
from special cases of propositions 3.7 and 3.8 applied to categories with one object
with its identity arrow.
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By Proposition 3.7 and the soundness of BBK models for H, every theorem of
Classicism holds in every action model. And by Proposition 3.8 and the complete-
ness part of Theorem 3.6, every formula consistent with Classicism holds on some
assignment in some action model. Thus:
Theorem 3.9. The class of action models is sound and complete for Classicism.
3.5 Exploring action models
One special case in which we can already do a lot is the case where the base category
has only one object. A category with only one object is called a monoid, and an
action of a monoid is called an M-set. Bacon (n.d.[b]) discusses the special one-
object case of action models under the label ‘M-set models’. Every instance of
the schema No Pure Contingency from §2.2 — i.e. P → □P for closed P with
no nonlogical constants — is true in anyM-set model, since as noted above when
P contains no nonlogical constants JP Kgℎ = JP Kgℎ′ for any arrows ℎ and ℎ′ with the
same target, and when P contains no free variables JP Kgℎ = JP Kg
′
ℎ for any assignmentfunctions g and g′.
We can already use fullM-set models to show that Classicism is consistent with
failures of ND and BF in arbitrary types, using the following facts:
1. ND holds in an action model A iff ℎ is injective for every arrow ℎ from A’sbase object.75
2. If ℎ is is surjective for every arrow ℎ with sourceW0 then BF holds in A.76
3. If A is functionally full and BF holds in A, then every ℎ with sourceW0 issurjective.77
75Proof: A, 1W0 ⊩ ∀xy.x ≠ y→ □x ≠ y iff A, 1W0 , g ⊩ □x ≠ y for all g such that gx ≠ gy, iff
A, ℎ, ℎ◦g ⊩ x ≠ y for all such g, all objects V , and all ℎ ∶ W0 → V , iff ℎ(gx) ≠ ℎ(gy) for all such
ℎ and g, iff ℎa ≠ ℎb.
76Proof: Suppose every ℎ with source W0 is surjective, and 1W0 , g ⊩ ∀y.□P . Let V be anyobject, a ∈ V  , and ℎ ∶ W0 → V . Then there is some b such that a = ℎb, and hence (ℎ◦g)[y ↦
a] = ℎ◦(g[y ↦ b). But since 1W0 , g[y ↦ b] ⊩ □.P , ℎ, ℎ◦(g[y ↦ b]) ⊩ P ; thus ℎ, (ℎ◦g)[y ↦
a] ⊩ P . Since awas arbitrary, it follows that ℎ, ℎ◦g ⊩ ∀y.P . And since ℎwas arbitrary, this implies
1W0 , g ⊩ □∀y.P77Suppose A is functionally full. ThenW →t0 contains the function  such that for any i ∶ W0 →
U and b ∈ U , (i,b) = {k ∣ kb = k(ia) for some a ∈ W 0 }. Note that for every a ∈ W 0 , (1W0 , a)is the set of all arrows fromW0, thus A, idW0 , [X ↦ ] ⊩ ∀y.□Xy. So if BF is true in A, we have
A, idW0 , [X ↦ ] ⊩ □∀y.Xy, hence A, ℎ, [X ↦ ℎ] ⊩ ∀y.Xy for every arrow ℎ ∶ W0 → V , andhence 1V ∈ ℎ(1V ,b) for every ℎ ∶ W0 → V and b ∈ V  , which means that for all such b there issome a ∈ W 0 such that b = ℎa, i.e. ℎ is surjective.
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Consider an action model whose base category has a single objectW0 and twoarrows, 1 = 1W0 and k, with k◦k = k. If we choose an action for type e—e.g.just have W e0 be a singleton—this, together with an interpretation of any nonlo-gical constants, uniquely determines a full model. Its propositional domain W t
contains four propositions, ∅, {1}, {k} and {1, k}. 1t is of course the identity func-
tion; kt(∅) = k{1} = ∅, kt({k}) = kt({1, k}) = {1, k}. Thus NDt and BFt both fail:the former since kt(∅) = k{1}; the latter, since the model is functionally full and
{1} is not in the range of kt.
By contrast, if we choose the base category to have one object and two arrows
with k◦k = i, we get a model in which□ND is true. Still there are four propositions
— ∅, {i}, {k}, and {i, k}— so the Fregean Axiom is false, establishing the (already
well-known) fact that C5 is weaker than Extensionalism.
For an M-set model with BF but not ND, we can consider a full model where
the base category is the monoid of all surjective functions on some infinite set X,
and choose −e in such a way that each ℎe is also surjective. We can show [*cite
TBN*] that in that case ℎ must also be surjective for every , which is sufficient
for the truth of BF for every type ; but NDt still fails, since when ℎ is not injective
ℎt{1} = {i ∣ i◦ℎ = 1} = ∅ = ℎt∅, so ℎt is not injective.
To model failures of No Pure Contingency, we can turn to categories with mul-
tiple objects. For example, consider a full model based on a category with two
objectsW0 andW1 and three arrows 1W0 , 1W1 , and k ∶ W0 → W1. Then the FregeanAxiom is false since there are four propositions ∅, {1W0}, {k}, {1W0 , k}, but it is notnecessarily false since it holds relative to k. For another example, consider a full
model based on the category with two objects W0 and W1 and three non-identityarrows ℎ ∶ W0 → W1, j ∶ W1 → W0, and k ∶ W1 → W1 (as well as the identityarrows 1W0 and 1W1), with k◦k = ℎ◦j = k. W t0 is the four-membered powersetof {1W0 , ℎ};W t1 is the eight-membered powerset of {1W1 , j, k}. NDt is false atW1,since jt{1W1} = jt{k} = {ℎ}. To show that NDt is true at W0 it suffices to showthat ℎ–the only non-identity arrow with sourceW0–acts injectively onW t0 . This istrue, since ℎt∅ = ∅, ℎt{1W0} = {j}, ℎt{ℎ} = {j, k}, and ℎt{1W0 , ℎ} = {1W1 , j, k}.So NDt is true in the model whereas□NDt is false. Note that while No Pure Con-tingency fails here, we do (unlike in the previou example) have the weaker schema
P → □◊P for all closed P . This will hold in any action model where every object
has an arrow from every other object.
Another case of special interest is that of action models where the base category
is a preorder category–one with at most one arrow having any given source and
target. (Any set with a transitive and reflexive relation R can be turned into such
a category by counting each ordered pair in R as an arrow from its first element to
its second element.) In this case, the analogy between objects in the category and
worlds in an S4 Kripke model becomes much closer; the objects with an arrow from
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a given object work like the worlds accessible from a world in a Kripke model with a
reflexive and transitive accessibility relation. In contrast with the most familiar way
of developing Kripke models for quantified modal logics including CBF, there is no
requirement that the domain of an accessible world contain the domain of the access-
ing world. The role of identity across domains is played instead by the “transition
functions”, ℎ, which provide elements in the domain of one world corresponding
to elements in the domain of another. In the case of type ewe could thus recover the
standard treatment of expanding domains by identifying the transition maps with
the inclusion mappings from a set to a superset. However this forces the truth of
NDe, and more generally, failures of ND at any type require non-injective transitionmaps. What one can do, if one wants to have the domains of all worlds be subsets
of one big domain is to associate each worldW with a partial equivalence relation
∼W on that domain (i.e. a reflexive and symmetric relation): failures of injectivityin the transition function from W to W ′ correspond to the case where two things
are related to themselves but not to each other atW , and are related to each other at
W ′, and failures of surjectivity correspond to the case where something is related to
itself atW ′ but not atW . For the details of these alternative “ExpandingModalized
Domain Models” see Bacon 2018a. There is a natural recipe for transforming one
sort of model into the other.78
In one way we would lose nothing by confining our attention to the class of ac-
tionmodels based on preorders: this class is also sound and complete for Classicism.
This follows from the fact that there is a procedure that “unravels” any action model
A based on an arbitrary category into a new modelA∗ based on a preorder category,
in which exactly the same formulae are true. The objects (worlds) of the preorder
are composable finite sequences of arrows of the old category, starting from the base
world: one such sequence is accessible from another (i.e. has an arrow to it) iff it
is an initial segment of it. We can think of each such sequence as a copy of the old
object that is the target of its final arrow, and there is a natural way of reading off
domains in each type for every sequence from the domains of that object. The inter-
pretations of terms in the old model map straightforwardly into the new model and
the mapping preserves truth. However, the models output by this unravelling pro-
cedure are neither propositionally nor functionally full (except in degenerate cases).
And indeed, the logic of propositionally and functionally full action models based
on preorders is a strict strengthening of the logic of all propositionally and function-
ally full action models. For instance, the following sentence belongs to the logic of
78The models in Bacon 2018a correspond to full preorder action models. The basic idea behind
the correspondence is this: any action −∗ of a preorder  corresponds to a “modalized domain”
⟨D∗,∼∗⟩ where the elements of D∗ are what we might call “modal worms”—maximal partial func-
tions f that map each worldW to an elements ofW ∗ in such a way that whenever ℎ ∶ W → W ′,
ℎ∗(f (W )) = f (W ′)—and f ∼∗W g iff f (W ) = g(W ).
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propositionally full action models based on preorders:




For to make the antecedent true, every world must see a world that does not see
it back, and so there must be infinitely many worlds, which in a propositionally
full model means that the porpositional domain at the base world. By contrast, we
already saw a one object action model that makes the antecedent true, that has only
two arrows, and four propositions. This affords us extra flexibility in constructing
models: full models are easy to construct, whereas checking that non-full action
models meet “sufficient fullness” condition is tricky.
Nevertheless, even the logic of all full action models is still rather strong. It may
be shown, by appeal to Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, that it is undecidable.79
But more importantly for our purposes, this logic also includes several of the more
controversial principles surveyed in §2.2. Atomicity and Actuality are both true, and
indeed necessarily true, in every propositionally full action model, for the obvious
reason: they contain all the singletons. And Rigid Comprehension and its necessita-
tion are true in every intensionally full actionmodel, since for every subsetX ofW 0 ,the element of X of W →t0 defined by X⟨ℎ, a⟩ = {i ∣ i(a) = (i◦ℎ)(b) for some
b ∈ X} is coextensive withX, persistent, and inextensible.80 So to explore the con-
sistency of packages in which some of these principles are false, or at least possibly
false, we will need ways of constructing non-full models. Appendix D develops one
method of constructing such models which can be used to verify the consistency of
many combinations of the controversial principles and their necessitations.
3.6 The consistency of Maximalist Classicism
Recall that for any theory T extending C (in a given signature ),Max T , the max-
imalization of T , is the result of adding ◊P to T for every closed -formula P
consistent with T . In this section we will see how action models can be used to
79There is a computable mapping from the language of arithmetic to that of pure higher-order
logic that maps all the arithmetical truths the validities in this class of models, and all the arithemtical
false to invalidities.
80One further limitation of full models is worth noting: if BF is true (in a given type), then so is
□BF. For in a full model,W →t0 contains the function  defined by (ℎ, x) = {i ∣ ix = i(ℎy) forsome y ∈ W 0 }. ∀y.□Xy is true on the assignment that maps X to this , so by the truth of BF sois □∀y.Xy. This means that for every ℎ ∶ W0 → W , 1W ∈ (ℎ, y) for every y ∈ W 0 ; i.e. ℎ issurjective. But if ℎ is surjective for every ℎ with sourceW0, i must be surjective for every i whosesource is reachable from W0, and hence BF must be true at every object reachable from W0, andhence□BF must be true atW0.
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prove the consistency of the maximalizations of Classicism and many other theor-
ies extending Classicism.
A crucial concept will be that of a truncation of an action model by an arrow
ℎ ∶ W0 → V . Informally a truncation is what you get by treating V as your newbase world, and throwing away objects with no arrow from V .81
Definition. When A = ⟨,W0,−⋅,⟩ is an action premodel and ℎ ∶ W0 → V ,the truncation of A by ℎ is the action premodel Aℎ = ⟨′, V ,−⋅′ ,′⟩ whose basecategory ′ contains all the arrows of  with an arrow from V and all arrows between
them; whose action −′ in each type is just the restriction of − to ′, and where for
each nonlogical constant c, ′c = ℎ(c).
It is easy to show (by induction on the complexity of terms) that for any term A,
JAKgAℎ,i = JAK
g
A,i◦ℎ: thusAℎ is in fact an actionmodel, not just a premodel. Moreover,
since the truth of ◊P for a closed sentence P amounts to its being true under some
arrow (i.e. 1trgℎ ∈ JP Kℎ), we can use this fact to show that for a closed sentence P :
◊P holds in an action model iff P holds in one of its truncations.
To show the consistency ofMax T , it is thus sufficient to find an action model A of
T such that T is complete with respect to the set of all truncations of A. Indeed, the
converse is also true: any action model of Max T must be such that T is complete
with respect to its truncations, since if P is consistent with T , ◊P holds in the
model, and thus P must hold in one of its truncations.82
We can thus establish the consistency of Maximalist Classicism by finding an
action model such that Classicism is complete with respect to its truncations. In
Appendix E, we will establish a stronger result which implies this:
Theorem 3.10. Every set X of action models whose base categories are disjoint
has a coalesced sum—an action model such that every member of X is among its
pruned truncations.
The informal idea behind this construction is this: lay out the rooted categories
corresponding to the action models in X side by side and add a new object, W0,at the bottom with a new arrow from W0 to the roots of the old categories and anidentity arrow for W0. (At this point you will have to add new arrows obtainedby composing the new arrows with the old.) Now you have a big rooted category
containing each of the rooted categories from X as truncations. This is turned into
a big action model by using the domains from the models in X to determine the
81It is related to the notion of a generated submodel from a world from modal logic.
82If T is closed under necessitation, then truncations of models of T will also be models of T , so
T will be sound as well as complete with respect to the the truncations of a model ofMax T .
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domains of the old objects, and atW0 we take the domains to be “as full as possible”.The intensions of the interpretations of relational nonlogical constants are chosen
so that their extensions relative to non-identity arrows are given by the old models,
and their actual extensions may be chosen freely.
This gives us what we need, since as we pointed out in §3.4, C is not only sound
and complete with respect to the proper class of all action models, but also with
respect to various sets of action models. And given any set of action models for
whichC is complete, we can easily turn it into a set whose base categories are disjoint
just by replacing each base category with an isomorphic copy.
Theorem 3.10 has other interesting consequences. In any category, a weakly
initial object is any object that has at least one arrow to every other object of that
category. If a category  of BBK-models of a certain signature  contains a weakly
initial object M, then M must be a model of MaxTh (where Th is the theory
of ), since the existence of a homomorphism ℎ ∶ M → N for BBK-models M
and N means that ◊P holds in M whenever P is closed and P holds in N. Thus
in particular,MaxC would have to hold in any weakly initial object in the category
of all BBK-models of C. But models of MaxC don’t have to be weakly initial in
this category, so the consistency ofMaxC doesn’t immediately imply the existence
of such a weakly initial object. But using Theorem 3.10, we can show that there is
such an object (at least when  is countable).
The key for this result is a version of the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem
for BBK-models: for every BBK-model M for a countable signature , there is a
BBK-model M↓ for  in which all the domains are countable such that there is a
truth-preserving homomorphism ℎ ∶ M↓ → M. (“Truth-preserving” in the sense
that wheneverM↓, g ⊩ P ,M, ℎ◦g ⊩ P .) The proof of this uses a similar technique
to Theorem 3.1 (the completeness theorem for BBK-models). Starting with our
BBK-modelM for , we can extend  to a larger (but still countable) language +,
and simultaneously extend M to a model M+ for + in such a way that whenever
a sentence ∃F of + is true in M+, FA is also true for some closed term A of +.
We can then make a new modelM− for  by throwing away all the elements of the
domains ofM+ that are not denoted by any closed term of +. The identity function
on each domain is a homomorphism from M− to M. And since + still only has
countably many terms in each type,M− is countable in every type.
We can replace all the elements of the domains of M− with natural numbers in
some arbitrary way to get a homomorphism to M from a BBKℕ-model (a BBK-
model where all domains are subsets of ℕ). So for each BBK-model M of some
theory T (in a countable signature), there is a BBKℕmodel of T ,M↓, and an inject-
ive homomorphism ℎ ∶ N → M. We also know that when T includes Classicism,
each BBK-model (and thus each BBKℕ model) of T is (BBK-)isomorphic to an
action model. So pick a set K big enough to index the BBKℕ models, and choose
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for each BBKℕ model Nk a corresponding action model Ak, in such a way that thebase categories of any two of these action models are disjoint. We can thus apply
Theorem 3.10 to show that there exists a coalesced sumA of all these action models.
We can consider this A as a BBK-model: it has a homomorphism to every BBKℕ
model, since it has a homomorphism to each of its truncations and each BBKℕ-
model is isomorphic to one of its truncations. But every BBK-model of C has a
homomorphism from some BBKℕ-model; composing this with the homomorph-
ism to that model from A, we can deduce that A (considered as a BBK-model) is
weakly initial in the category of BBK-models of T . In particualr, there is a weakly
initial object in category of BBK-models of Classicism for any countable signature.
The existence of a weakly initial object in the category of BBK-models of T (e.g.
Classicism for a given signature) leaves several questions open:
(iii) Is there an initial object in the category of all BBK-models of T—i.e. an
object with exactly one homomorphism into each BBK-model of T ?
(iv) Is there an object in the category of all BBK-models of T with an injective
homomorphism into every weakly initial object in the category?
If the answer to the first question is ‘yes’, the answer to the second question must
also be ‘yes’, since if M is initial and N is weakly initial, there must be a homo-
morphism ℎ ∶M → N and a homomorphism i ∶ N → N, and moreover since 1M isthe only homomorphism fromM → M, we must have i◦ℎ = 1M which implies that
ℎ is injective. If the answer to the second question is ‘yes’, then then the “Strong
Possibility” schema for T—whose instances are ◊≠P for all closed P consistentwith T—is consistent, since the existence of an injective homomorphism fromM to
Nmeans that whenever P is closed and true in N,◊≠P is true inM. Unfortunately,the models we construct in our proof of Theorem 3.10 are generally very large; their
homomorphisms to their truncations are very far from being injective. So estab-
lishing a positive answer to either of the above questions would, at least, require a
fairly extensive modification of the model-construction technique used in the proof
of Theorem 3.10.
We hope that action models will be a useful tool for the investigation of these
and many other open questions concerning the space of consistent extensions of
Classicism.
A Closure of Classicism under Equiv+
This appendix will show that the theory that results from adding the Boolean and
Classicist Identities to H is closed under Equiv+. Since any H-theory closed un-
der Equiv+ must contain every instance of Logical Equivalence, and the Boolean
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and Classicist Identities are all -equivalent to instances of Logical Equivalence, it
follows that Classicism can be characterised either as the smallest H-theory closed
under Equiv+, the smallest H-theory containing every instance of Logical Equival-
ence, or the smallest H-theory containing the Boolean and Classicist Identities.
In what follows, ⊢ denotes provability from H + the Boolean and Classicist
Identities.
Lemma A.1. ⊢ □∀x(⊤)
Proof.
⊢ (X.∀X ∨ p) = (X.∀y(Xy ∨ p)) (Absorption-∀∨)(1)
⊢ (X.∀X ∨ p)X⊤ = (X.∀y(Xy ∨ p))X⊤ 1,LL(2)
⊢ ∀X ∨ ⊤ = ∀y(Xy ∨ ⊤) 2, (3)
⊢ ⊤ = ∀y(⊤) (3, Booleanism)
LemmaA.2. For any formulaP and sequence of variables v⃗, if⊢ P then⊢ (v⃗.P ) =
(v⃗.⊤).
Proof. By induction (“on the length of proofs”). Base cases:
(i) P is an instance of PC. Then (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.⊤) follows from the Boolean
identities.
(ii) P is an instance ∀F → Fa of UI. Then:
⊢ (Xy.Xy) = (Xy.Xy ∨ ∀X) (Absorption-∨∀)(1)
⊢ (v⃗.∀F → (Xy.Xy)Fa) = (v⃗.∀F → (Xy.Xy ∨ ∀X)Fa) 1, LL(2)
⊢ (v⃗.∀F → FA) = (v⃗.∀F → (FA ∨ ∀F )) 2, (3)
⊢ (v⃗.∀F → FA = v⃗.⊤) (3, Booleanism)(4)
(iii) P is an instance Fa→ ∃F of EG. Similar to (ii), using Absorption-∧∃
(iv) P is an instance a = a of Ref. Then:
⊢ (yz.y = z) = (yz.∀X.Xy↔ Xz) Identity Identity(1)
⊢ (v⃗.a = a) = (v⃗.(yz.y = z)a) (2)
⊢ (v⃗.a = a) = (v⃗.(yz.∀X.Xy↔ Xz)a) 1, 2, LL(3)
⊢ (v⃗.a = a) = (v⃗.∀X.Xa↔ Xa) 3, (4)
⊢ (v⃗.a = a) = (v⃗.∀X.⊤) 4, Booleanism(5)
⊢ (v⃗.a = a) = (v⃗.⊤) 5, Lemma A.1(6)
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(vi) P is an instance a = b→ Fa→ Fb of LL. Similar to (iv).
(vii) P is an instance P ′ ↔ Q of  or . Then (v⃗.P ′ ↔ Q) = (v⃗.Q ↔ Q) is
also an instance of  or  (respectively). But by Booleanism (v⃗.Q↔ Q) = (v⃗.⊤);
so by LL, ⊢ (v⃗.P ′ ↔ Q) = (v⃗.⊤).
(viii) P is a closed identity A = B that is one of the Boolean or Classicist Iden-
tities. Then ⊢ (v⃗.A = B) = (v⃗.A = A) by the relevant identity, Ref, and LL, so
⊢ (v⃗.A = B) = (v⃗.⊤) by Ref and LL.
Inductive steps:
(i) P follows by MP from some Q and Q → P . By IH, ⊢ (v⃗.Q) = (v⃗.⊤) and
⊢ (v⃗.Q → P ) = (v⃗.⊤). Then we can appeal to the Boolean identities to derive
that (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.⊤):
v⃗.P = v⃗.P ∨ (Q ∧ (Q→ P ))
= v⃗.P ∨ ((v⃗.Q)v⃗ ∧ (v⃗.Q→ P )v⃗)
= v⃗.P ∨ ((v⃗.⊤)v⃗ ∧ (v⃗.⊤)v⃗)
= v⃗.P ∨ (⊤ ∧ ⊤)
= v⃗.⊤
(ii) P is of the form P ′ → ∀u.Q and follows byGen from some previously proved
P ′ → Q. By the induction hypothesis, ⊢ (v⃗u.P ′ → Q) = (v⃗u.⊤). So we have
(Xp.∀X ∨ p) = (Xp.∀u.Xu ∨ p) (Dist-∨∀)
(1)
(v⃗.(Xp.∀X ∨ p)(u.Q)(¬P ′)) = (v⃗.(Xp.∀u.Xu ∨ p)(u.Q)(¬P ′)) 1, Ref, LL
(2)
(v⃗.Xp.(∀u.Q) ∨ ¬P ′) = (v⃗.Xp.∀u.(v⃗u.Q ∨ ¬P ′)v⃗u 2, 
(3)
(v⃗.P ′ → ∀u.Q) = (v⃗.∀u.(v⃗u.P ′ → Q)v⃗u) (3, def. →)
(4)
(v⃗.P ′ → ∀u.Q) = (v⃗.∀u.(v⃗u.⊤)v⃗u) 4, IH
(5)
(v⃗.P ′ → ∀u.Q) = (v⃗.∀u.⊤) 5, 
(6)
(v⃗.P ′ → ∀u.Q) = (v⃗.⊤) (6, Lemma A.1)
(7)
(iii) P is of the form (∃v.P ′) → Q and follows from some previously proved
P ′ → Q by Inst. Similar to (ii) using Dist-∧∃.
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X→tY →t.∀X ≤ XY .∀(X ∨→t Y )Monotonicity-∀
X→ty.∀X ≤ X.XInstantiation
p.p ≤ p.∀x .pVac-∀
X→tY →t.∃(X ∧→t Y ) ≤ XY .∃XMonotonicity-∃
X→t.X ≤ Xy.∃XGeneralization
p.∃x .p ≤ p.pVac-∃
Figure 7. The Adjunctive Entailments
Proposition A.3. Classicism is closed under Equiv+.
Proof. Suppose ⊢ A ↔ B; then ⊢ (v⃗.A ↔ B) = (v⃗.⊤) by the previous lemma.
Then:
⊢ (v⃗.A) = (v⃗.(B ∧ (A↔ B)) ∨ (¬B ∧ ¬(A↔ B))) Booleanism
(1)
⊢ (v⃗.A) = (v⃗.B ∧ (v⃗.A ↔ B)v⃗ ∨ (¬B ∧ ¬(v⃗.A ↔ B)v⃗)) 
(2)
⊢ (v⃗.A) = (v⃗.B ∧ (v⃗.⊤)v⃗ ∨ (¬B ∧ ¬(v⃗.⊤)v⃗)) Lemma A.2
(3)
(v⃗.A) = (v⃗.B ∧ ⊤ ∨ (¬B ∧ ¬⊤)) 
(4)
(v⃗.A) = (v⃗.B) Booleanism
B An axiomatization in terms of entailment
This appendix will discuss a couple of other axiomatizations of Classicism which
give a central role to the entailment relations ≤ . Recall (from Figure 1) that ≤is short for XY .Y = Y ∨ X. Booleanism proves that ≤ is reflexive, transitive,and antisymmetric in each type, and that it is identical to XY .X = X ∧ Y . Thefirst axiomatization we’ll discuss is given by adding the schemas in Figure 7, along
with the Identity Identity, to an axiomatization of Booleanism. Deriving these from
the Classicist Identities (Figure 4) is straightforward. Note that ∀-Instantiation and
∃-Generalization just rewrite Absorption-∨∀ and Absorption-∧∃ using ≤. Vac-∀
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and Vac-∃, meanwhile, can be derived from Dist-∨∀ and Dist-∧∃ by instantiatingX
with (x.⊥) and (x.⊤), respectively.
To preserve the duality of the axioms, we stated Monotonicity axioms using ∨
for ∀ and ∧ for ∃, but we could just as well have used the same connective in both
cases. The axioms imply that ifX ≤→t Y (i.e. Y = X∨→tY ), then ∀X ≤ ∀Y and
∃X ≤ ∃Y . To see what’s going on with the remaining Adjunctive Entailments, wecan suggestively rewrite (-equivalents of) them using the following abbreviations:
I ≔ x .x
K, ≔ xy .x
A◦B ≔ x.A(Bx)





In the theory of partial orders, when we have two partially ordered sets, (X,≤1)and (Y ,≤2), a function f ∶ X → Y is monotonic just in case whenever x ≤1 x′,
f (x) ≤2 f (x′). When f ∶ X → Y and g ∶ Y → X, we say that f is a right adjointof g, and g a left adjoint of f , just in case both are monotonic and:
x ≤1 g(f (x)) for every x ∈ X(i)
f (g(y)) ≤2 y for every y ∈ Y(ii)
Using common notational shorthands, (i) and (ii) can be rewritten respectively as
1X ≤1 g◦f and f◦g ≤2 1Y , mirroring the pair of Vac-∀ and Instantiation, or Gen-eralization and Vac-∃..83 These axioms can thus be summed up by saying that uni-
versal and existential quantifiers in type (→ t)→ t are respectively a right-adjoint
and a left-adjoint of the K combinator in type t → ( → t). H already implies that
the K combinator is monotonic: if p ≤ q, then q = p ∨ q, so x.q = x.p ∨ q =
(x.p) ∨→t (x.q), i.e. K,tp ≤ K,tq.84
83Here 1Z stands for the identity function on the set Z, and where ℎ and ℎ′ are functions fromsome set Z to a partial order, ℎ ≤ ℎ′ means that ℎ(z) ≤ ℎ′(z) for all z ∈ Z.
84More generally, for any type  (ending in t), the above axioms entail that the “lifted” quantifiers
∀, and ∃, (see Figure 1) are respectively right and left adjoints of K, . By contrast, if we onlyhad the quantified versions of the axioms—e.g. ∀p.(p ≤ ∀x.p) instead of (p.p) ≤ (p.∀x.p)—
we would not be able to derive this generalization (unless we rely on some new axioms or rules
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Our definition of ‘f is a right adjoint of g’ is easily seen to be equivalent to the
following: for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , x ≤1 g(y) iff f (x) ≤2 y.85 This bicondi-tional definition of adjointness suggests yet another axiomatization of Classicism,
which adds the following biconditionals to Booleanism (together with the Identity
Identity):
((v0v⃗.Q) ≤ (v0v⃗.P ))↔ ((v⃗.Q) ≤ (v⃗.∀v0.P ))Adjunction-∀
((v0v⃗.P ) ≤ (v0v⃗.Q))↔ ((v⃗.∀v0.P ) ≤ (v⃗.Q))Adjunction-∃
where in each case v0 is not free inQ.86 Dorr (2014) shows how these principles canbe regarded as capturing the “validity” of the standard natural deduction quantifier
rules for ∀ and ∃, in a certain natural sense of “validity” on which linguistic facts
about validity boil down to nonlinguistic facts about entailment.
To derive the left-to-right direction ofAdjunction-∀ from theAdjunctive Entail-
ments, note that we have (v⃗.Q) ≤ (v⃗.∀v0.Q) by Vac-∀, which given the left-handside, Monotonicity-∀, and the transitivity of entailment gives (v⃗.Q) ≤ (v⃗.∀v0.P ).To derive the right-to-left direction ofAdjunction-∀, note that we have ((v0v⃗.∀v0.P ) ≤
(v0.v⃗.P )) by Instantiation, which given the right-hand-side, Monotonicity-∀, andthe transitivity of entailment gives ((v0v⃗.Q) ≤ (v0v⃗.P )). In the other direc-tion, the Adjunctive Entailments for ∀ follow from the following three instances
of Adjunction-∀:
((yX.∀y.Xy) ≤ (yX.Xy))↔ ((X.∀y.Xy) ≤ (X.∀y.Xy))(i)
((xp.p) ≤ (xp.p))↔ ((p.p) ≤ (p.∀x.p))(ii)
((zXY .∀z.Xz) ≤ (zXY .Xz ∨ Y z))↔ ((XY .∀z.Xz) ≤ (XY .∀z.Xz ∨ Y z))
(iii)
to be discussed below). This situation, where failures of functionality motivate replacing quantified
identities involving functions with identities between functions, instantiates a pattern that is pervasive
in category theory. In this context, standard set theoretic definitions involving functions understood
set theoretically can be turned into definitions that make sense in some more general category, by
first formulating them in a way that doesn’t directly involve quantifying over members of the set, and
consequently doesn’t make any strong functionality assumptions.
85If x ≤1 g(y), then f (x) ≤2 f (g(y)) by the monotonicity of f , so f (x) ≤2 y by (ii) and thetransitivity of ≤2; if f (x) ≤2 y, then g(f (x)) ≤1 g(y) by the monotonicity of g, so x ≤1 g(y) by (i)and the transitivity of ≤1. In the other direction, (i) and (ii) follow immediately from the reflexivityof ≤1 and ≤2 respectively, while the monotonicity of f and g follows from their transitivity.86Dorr (2016, note 59) states these bicondtionals (using the definition of entailment in terms of
identity), describing them rather inscrutably, as the ‘natural analogues of Booleanism for the quanti-
fiers’. The principle ‘Adjunction’ in Goodman 2016 is strictly weaker: it is equivalent to the special
case of Adjunction-∀ where v⃗ is empty.
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The right side of (i) and the left side of (ii) are both consequences of the reflexivity
of ≤, and their other sides are -equivalent to Instantiation and Vac-∀ respectively.
Meanwhile, the left side of (iii) follows from Instantiation given Booleanism, and
its right side is -equivalent to Monotonicity-∀.
C Soundness and completeness of action models for Classicism
This appendix will prove the following two results stated in §3.4, which together
with Theorem 3.6 imply the soundness and completeness of action models for Clas-
sicism.
Proposition 3.7. Any action model can be turned into a BBK-model which makes
the same formulae true, and in which every instance of Logical Equivalence is true.
Proposition 3.8. For every small, intensional category of BBK-models, andmodel
M0 in  there is an action model AM in which the same formulae hold.
For Proposition 3.7, suppose A is an action model with base objectW0 and ℎ ∶
W0 → V . Then we will construct BBK-model MℎA by setting each type- domainto be V  for each type , JAKg = JAKgA,ℎ for every term, and valp = 1 iff 1V ∈ p.
Looking at the definitions of BBK-model and action model, it is obvious that MℎAobeys all the conditions to be a BBK-model apart from condition (ii.d) (that JAKg =
JBKg when A and B are -equivalent). To establish this, we must first show that
our interpretation functions are well-behaved in a few other ways.
To begin with, we need the following fundamental fact about the interpretation
functions:
Proposition C.1. In any action premodel, when ℎ ∶ W0 → W1 and i ∶ W1 → W2,
g is an assignment forW1, and A is a type- term such that JAKgℎ is defined,
JAKi◦gi◦ℎ = i
JAKgℎ
Proof. By induction on the complexity of terms. It is immediate for variables and
nonlogical constants. For the logical constants, the claim follows from the fact that
they do not care about the first co-ordinate of their argument (the arrow). For ex-
ample, it→t→tJ∧Kgℎ = it→t→t((l,p) ↦ (j,q) ↦ jt(p) ∪ q) = (m,p) ↦ (j,q) ↦
jt(p) ∪ q = J∧Ki◦gi◦ℎ. For an abstraction v.A where v is of type  and A of type ,
Jv.AKi◦gi◦ℎ⟨j, a⟩ = JAK(j◦i◦g)[v↦a]j◦i◦ℎ = Jv.AKgℎ⟨j◦i, a⟩ = (i→Jv.AKgℎ)⟨j, a⟩ (since i→acts by division). For an application AB where A is of type  and B of type , we
have JABKi◦gi◦ℎ = JAKi◦gi◦ℎ⟨1W2 , JBKi◦gi◦ℎ⟩ = (i→JAKgℎ)⟨1W2 , iJBKgℎ⟩ (by the induction
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hypothesis) = JAKgℎ⟨i, iJBKgℎ⟩ (since i→ acts by division) = i(JAKgℎ⟨1W1 , JBKgℎ⟩)(since JAKgℎ ∈ W ⇒1 ) = iJABKgℎ.
Proposition C.2. Suppose that in an action model A, JAKgℎ = JBKgℎ whenever eitherside is defined. Then JΦ[A]Kgℎ = JΦ[B]Kgℎ whenever Φ[A] and Φ[B] are terms thatdiffer only by the replacement of an occurrence of A for one of B.
Proof. By induction on the construction of Φ[A] from A.
Proposition C.3. JA[B∕v]Kgℎ = JAK
g[v↦JBKgℎ]
ℎ whenever both sides are defined.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of terms.
Proposition C.4. J(v.A)BKgℎ = JA[B∕v]K
g
ℎ.




JA[B∕v]Kgℎ by Proposition C.3.
Proposition C.5. Jv.AvKgℎ = JAK
g
ℎ when v is not free in A.
Proof.
Jv.AvKgℎ = ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ JAvK
(i◦g)[v↦a]
i◦ℎ by the clause for abstraction
= ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ JAK(i◦g)[v↦a]i◦ℎ ⟨1trg i, JvK
(i◦g)[v↦a]
i◦ℎ ⟩ by the clause for application
= ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ JAKi◦gi◦ℎ⟨1trg i, a⟩ since v isn’t free in A
= ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ (i→JAKgℎ)⟨1trg i, a⟩ by Proposition C.1
= ⟨i, a⟩ ↦ JAKgℎ⟨i, a⟩ by the definition of i→
Proposition C.6. When A and B are -equivalent, JAKgℎ = JBKgℎ whenever g isadequate for both.
Proof. By Proposition C.4, Proposition C.5, and Proposition C.2.
This implies that MℎA is always a BBK-model, in which a formula P holds onan assignment g iff A, ℎ, g ⊩ P . We can also show that every instance of Logical
Equivalence holds in every action model (relative to every ℎ, g):
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Proposition C.7. If H ⊢ P ↔ Q then A, ℎ, g ⊩ (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q) for all ℎ, g, v⃗.
Proof. Suppose H ⊢ P ↔ Q. Then by what we have just proved, for any ℎ from
A’s base object W0 to some V , A, ℎ, g ⊩ P iff A, ℎ, g ⊩ Q. Hence JP Kgℎ = JQKgℎfor all ℎ and g, and so by Proposition C.2, Jv⃗.P Kgℎ = Jv⃗.QKgℎ for all ℎ and g, so
A, ℎ, g ⊩ (v⃗.P ) = (v⃗.Q) for all ℎ and g.
It follows that class of all action models is sound for Classicism.
Turning to Proposition 3.8, suppose  is a small, intensional category of BBK-
models, and M0 is an object in it. We’ll use these construct an action model AM0and show that the same formulae hold in it. First we truncate  by throwing away
any models with no homomorphism fromM0. Then we chooseAM0’s base categoryto be  and its base object to be M0. For each M in  and each type , we let M’stype- domain (considered now as an object inAM0) be the range of the function f Mwhose domain isM (M’s built-in type- domain), defined recursively as follows.
f eMa = a
f tMp = val

M p








To establish the legitimacy of this definition, we must simultaneously prove that
each f M is injective. The first clause automatically secure this for type e; the quasi-Fregeanness of  secures it for type t, and the quasi-functionality of  guarantees it
for types → .
AM0 so defined is automatically an action premodel. Moreover, we can showby induction on the complexity of formulae that for any term A of type , any ℎ ∶





















or in other words,
M0, g ⊩ P iff AM0 , 1M0 , fM0◦g ⊩ P .
Since fM0 is bijective, it follows that P holds inM iff it holds in AM0 .One noteworthy feature of this construction is that since any two homomorph-
isms from one BBK-model to another must agree on the interpretations of all non-
logical constants, the generated action models AM0 will always obey the followingcondition of non-logical harmony: ℎ(c) = i(c) whenever ℎ, i ∶ W0 → V and
c is a nonlogical constant. In a non-logically harmonious model, all that matters
about an arrow as far the interpretation function is concerned is its target: i.e. when
ℎ, i ∶ W0 → V , JAKgℎ = JAKgi when defined.87 Our proof of Proposition 3.8 showsthat Classicism is also complete for non-logically harmonious action models. But
we find the more general notion more intuitive, in that any model for in which ∃x.Fx
is true can be extended into a model for a larger signature in which Fc is true for
some new constant, and also more useful, in that it allows one to construct smaller
models of certain theories involving nonlogical constants.
D Consistency results using non-full action models
This appendix will introduce a technique for defining certain non-full action models,
and use it to verify the consistency of certain packages of principles from §2.
We start with the following definition.
Definition. Suppose −∗ and −† are two actions on a category , A is an object of ,
X ⊆ A† and y ∈ A∗. Then y is pinned down by X iff for any object B and arrows
ℎ, i ∶ A→ B, if ℎ†x = i†x for all x ∈ X, then ℎ∗y = i∗y.
Definition. Suppose −∗ and −† are actions on  and −‡ is a subaction of the “power
action” on −† (i.e., A‡ ⊆ A† for each object and ℎ‡X = {ℎ†y ∣ y ∈ X}). Then
y ∈ A∗ is pinned down by −‡ iff y is pinned down by some X ∈ A‡. And −∗ is
pinned down by −‡ iff for every A, every x ∈ A∗ is pinned down by −‡.
Definition. When A = ⟨,W0,−⋅,⟩ is an action premodel, −† is an action on and −‡ is a subaction of its power action, A is −‡-full iff
(i) −e is any action pinned down by −‡
87This is shown by a straightforward induction on the complexity of terms: the logical constants
all have this property, since they denote functions whose value on a given pair ⟨ℎ, a⟩ does not depend
on ℎ.
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(ii) For eachW ,W t = {p ∈ W  ∣ p is pinned down by −‡}
(iii) For eachW ,W → = { ∈ W ⇒ ∣  is pinned down by −‡}.
We have the following sufficient condition for−‡-full action premodel to be an action
model:
Proposition D.1. If A is a −∗-full action premodel and −‡ is closed under finite
unions—i.e., X ∪ Y ∈ A‡ whenever X ∈ A‡ and Y ‡—then A is an action model.
Proof. We use the alternative version of the sufficient fullness condition given by
note 74. Since the denotation of each logical constant relative to any ℎ ∶ W0 → Vis a function  in some V → with the property that ⟨i, a⟩ = ⟨j, a⟩ whenever
i, j ∶ V → U and a ∈ U , i→ = j→ for any two such parallel i, j, so 
is pinned down by ∅ ∈ V ‡. Similarly for the S and K combinators. So all we
need to show is that when  ∈ W ⇒ and b ∈ V  are both pinned down by −‡
and ℎ ∶ W → V , ⟨ℎ,b⟩ is also pinned down by −‡. Let X ∈ W ‡ pin down 
and Y ∈ V ‡ pin down b. Then we can show that ℎ‡X ∪ Y , which belongs to V ‡
since −‡ is an ideal action, pins down ⟨ℎ,b⟩. For suppose i, j ∶ U → V agree on
ℎ‡X∪Y . Then they agree on Y , so ib = jb. And they agree onℎ‡X, which implies
that i◦ℎ and j◦ℎ agree on X, which implies that (i◦ℎ)→ = (j◦ℎ)→. Hence,
i(⟨ℎ,b⟩) = ⟨i◦ℎ, ib⟩) = ((i◦ℎ)→)⟨1U , ib⟩) = ((j◦ℎ)→)⟨1U , jb⟩) =
⟨j◦ℎ, jb⟩) = j(⟨ℎ,b⟩).
The payoff of this is that we have a way of building non-full models to verify
the consistency of various packages of principles. All we have to specify is the
underlying category , an action −† on , an subaction −‡ of its power action that
is closed under finite unions, and an action at type e (making sure that this is pinned
down by −‡). In what follows, we will often (for the sake of concreteness) choose
 to be a subcategory of Set, and −† = −e to be the identity action on  (i.e.W † =
W e = W and ℎ† = ℎe = ℎ). Often, we will take W ‡ to be set of all finite subsets
ofW †(= W ).
Let’s consider what the action model constructed in this way will look like where
 is the permutation group on ℕ: i.e., the category with just one objectW0, namely
ℕ, and whose arrows are all the bijections ℕ → ℕ.
• W e0 = ℕ; ℎe = ℎ for all ℎ ∶ ℕ → ℕ.
• W t0 is the set of all p ⊆ ℕℕ which are pinned down by some finite X ⊆ ℕ.That is: whenever ℎx = ix for all x ∈ X, ℎ ∈ p iff i ∈ p.
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• W →0 is the set of all  ∈ W ⇒0 which are pinned down by some finite
X ⊆ ℕ. That is: whenever ℎx = ix for all x ∈ X, (ℎ,b) = (i,b) for all
b ∈ W 0 .
The intuition for this model is that there are infinitely many individuals, all play-
ing distinct qualitative roles, and over which the roles can be redistributed in any
way. Each arrow ℎ represents the possibility where each individual n plays the role
actually played by ℎ(n). But the only propositions and properties are ones that are
“about” some finite collection of objects, and thus indifferent to the question how
the qualitative roles are distributed over objects not in that collection.
What sentences hold in this model?
• ND and BF are true: every arrow has an inverse, which implies its action is
bijective in each type. □ND and□BF are also true—since this is a one-object
model, No Pure Contingency holds in it. (See 3.5.)
• Actuality is false. Take any p ∈ W t0 that is true (i.e. contains 1ℕ). p is pinneddown by some finite X ⊆ ℕ. Choose n ∉ X, and let q = {ℎ ∈ p ∶ ℎn = n}.
q clearly is pinned down by X ∪ {n}, and thus also belongs to W t0 . It’s alsotrue since it contains 1. ⟨q,p⟩ is in the extension of J≤K, since q is a subset
of p. But also q ≠ p. For suppose ℎ ∈ q, and let ℎ′ be the function that
agrees with ℎ except that ℎ′n = n+ 1. Then ℎ′ ∉ q since ℎ′n ≠ n, but ℎ′ ∈ p
since ℎ′ ∼X ℎ. Indeed by similar reasoning, we can show that Atomlessness—
∀p(◊p→ ∃q(q ≤ p ∧ q ≠ p ∧◊q)—is true in the model.
We thus verify that the bottom inclusion in Figure 6 is strict: C5 does not imply
Actuality.
To get ND to fail while keeping BF, we can just change the underlying monoid
to include all the surjective functions on ℕ. ND will now fail, since some arrows
fail to be injective (in type e and hence in every type). BF still holds: since every
ℎ has a right inverse i such that ℎ◦i = 1ℕ, ℎ must be surjective in each type (sinceanything not in its range couldn’t be in the range of (ℎ◦i)). Atomlessness is still
true for the same reason as before, which implies that Actuality and Atomicity are
both false. Moreover, Rigid Comprehension is false. Consider the function  ∶
ℕℕ × ℕ → (ℕ) where for any ℎ and n, (ℎ, n) = {i ∶ in is even}. This belongs to
W e⇒t0 . Moreover, it is pinned down by ∅ (since it doesn’t care about its ℎ argumentat all), and thus is inW e→t0 . Its extension is the set of even numbers: we can thinkof it as expressing the disjunction of all the qualitative roles corresponding to even
numbers. By contrast, for  ∈ W e→t0 ,  is in the extension of JRigidK iff for some
X ∈ N , (ℎ, n) = {i ∣ in = i(ℎ(m)) for some m ∈ X}, in which case X is the
extension of . But when X is infinite, such a  is not pinned down by any finite
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X, and thus is not in W t0 . Thus, no rigid property in the model has the set of evennumbers as its extension, making  a counterexample to Rigid Comprehension.
What if we want BF to fail too? We might expect that we could do this by
choosing  to be the monoid of all functions ℕ → ℕ. But BF turns out to hold in
this model as well—surprisingly, since intuitively the function that, e.g., maps every
number to 0 represents a possibility in which there are lots of new individuals. We
first observe that if ℎ ∶ ℕ → ℕ is surjective, it has a right inverse i such that
ℎ◦i = 1ℕ so that ℎ must be surjective for every . Now note that for any finite
X ⊂ ℕ and any ℎ ∶ ℕ → ℕ, there is a surjective function that agrees with ℎ on X.
Suppose for contradiction that for some  ∈ W →t0 , ∀y.□Xy is true on [X ↦ ]even though□∀y.Xy is false on the same assignment. The first assumption implies
that ⟨1, a⟩ = ℕℕ for all a ∈ W 0 . The second implies that there are ℎ, i and a suchthat i ∉ (ℎ, a). But since  ∈ W →t0 ,  is pinned down by some finiteX ⊆ ℕ. Let jbe surjective and agree with ℎ onX. Since  is pinned down byX, (j, a) = ⟨ℎ, a⟩,
so i ∉ (j, a). But since j is surjective, there is some b such that jb = a, and
hence (j, a) = jt((1,b)) = jt(ℕℕ) = ℕℕ: contradiction.
So what canwe do to make BF come out false? One way is to choose the monoid
to contain just the functions ℎ ∶ ℕ → ℕ such that for some n: ℎ(m) = m for all
m < n, and for all m ≤ n, ℎ(m) is even and ≤ n. (This family is closed under
composition: if ℎ and ℎ′ both meet the condition for n and n′ respectively, where
n ≤ n′, then ℎ◦ℎ′ and ℎ′◦ℎ both meet it for n.) Let  = ⟨ℎ, n⟩ ↦ {i ∶ in is even }.
This is pinned down by ∅ since it is indifferent to its ℎ argument: intuitively, it is the
qualitative property of being even. Consider the interpretations of ∀y.□(Xz→ Xy)
and □∀y.Xz → Xy on the assignment [X ↦ , z ↦ 1]. The latter is false, since
∀y.Xz denotes ∅ on this assignment. But the former is true, since every arrow that
sends 1 to an even number sends every number to an even number.
Atomlessness still holds in that model for the same reason as before—we can
make any consistent proposition more informative by making it care about numbers
that weren’t in the set that pinned down the original proposition. To get a model
where Actuality holds but BF still fails, we can consider the monoid of functions ℎ
where either ℎ(m) is even for all m, or ℎ is 1ℕ. Now Actuality holds, since {1} ispinned down by {1}: it is {ℎ ∣ ℎ1 is even}. But ND, BF, Atomicity, and Rigid Com-
prehension are all false, for the same reasons as before. (Indeed, the actual world
is the only atomic proposition: the restriction of Atomlessness to false propositions
holds in the model.)
For a model where Actuality and BF both hold while Atomicity and Rigid Com-
prehension fail, let  be the monoid of all surjections ℎ ∶ ℕ → ℕ such that either
ℎ = 1ℕ or ℎ0 = ℎ1.For a model where Atomicity holds while BF, Actuality, and Rigid Compre-
hension fail, let the monoid contain just 1ℕ together with the functions gn, where
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gn(m) = m when m ≤ n and gn(m) = 0 when m > n. (This is closed under compos-ition: when n ≤ n′, gn◦gn′ = gn′◦gn = gn.) Actuality fails for the same reason asbefore. But Atomicity now holds. For n > 0, {gn} is pinned down by {n − 1, n, n},since it is {ℎ ∣ ℎ(n−1) ≠ ℎ(n) and ℎ(n) = ℎ(n+1)}; {g0} is pinned down by {0, 1},since it is {ℎ ∣ ℎ(0) = ℎ(1)}. Thus every {gn} is pinned down by some finite set;moreover, every nonempty proposition in the domain contains some gn.For a model where Atomicity, Actuality, and BF hold while Rigid Comprehen-
sion and ND fail, let the monoid contain just the functions fn for even n, where
fn(m) = 0 when m ≤ n and f (n) = m − n otherwise. These are all surjective, soBF holds. The atom {fn} is {ℎ ∣ ℎ(n − 1) = ℎ(n) and ℎ(n) ≠ ℎ(n + 1)}, and {f0}is {ℎ ∣ ℎ(0) ≠ ℎ(1)}, so all they are all finitely pinned down; but {f0} is {1ℕ} andthus witnesses Actuality.
All of themodels considered so far in this appendix have been based onmonoids,
so that No Pure Contingency holds in them. To model cases where some of the
principles are only contingently true or false, we can turn to multi-object models.
For example, for any of the above models, we can adjoin a second objectW1 whichis a second copy ofℕ. The arrows fromW0 to itself are as before; every permutationof ℕ corresponds to an arrow fromW1 to itself; every function ℕ → ℕ correspondsto an arrow from W0 to W1; there are no arrows from W1 to W0. W ∗0 is the set offinite subsets ofℕ, butW ∗1 is the set of all subsets ofℕ. Then all the same principles(from among ND, BF, Atomicity, Actuality, Rigid Comprehension) are true, but we
also have ◊(□ND ∧ Atomicity): it is possible that C5 true.
A wide range of other distributions of necessity, contingent truth, contingent
falsehood, and impossibility over the principles can be modelled in a similar way.
One particularly interesting result is that we can have BF without□BF. For this, we
can use a two-object model W0 = ℕ and W1 = {0}, with all functions as arrows.As before, −∗ is the ideal of finite subsets; thusW ∗1 = {∅, {0}}. BF is false atW1,since ∀y.□x = y is true and□∀y.x = y on the assignment [x ↦ 0]. But BF is true
atW0, for the same reason that we found it to be true before when we looked at themonoid of all functions on ℕ: for any function and finite set, there is a surjective
function that agrees with that function on that set.
One thing we haven’t yet confirmed is that Actuality doesn’t imply Atomicity in
C5. We can show this using a mild generalization of the techniques of this appendix.
Consider a category with two objectsW0 andW1 which are both copies of ℕ, wherethe arrows between any pair of objects correspond to the permutations of ℕ and
composition is composition. In constructing −t we impose a new constraint: for
a set of arrows to belong to W t0 or W t1 , it must not only be pinned down by somesubset ofW0 orW1 (respectively), but must also be such that whenever it containsan arrow ℎ ∶ Wi → W1, it also contains g◦ℎ for every g ∶ W0 → W0. In highertypes we proceed as before: W →i contains just those  ∈ W →i that are pinned
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down by some finite set. In this model, the smallest set in W t0 that contains 1W0 isthe set of all arrows W0 → W0, so this set witnesses the truth of Actuality at W0.But Actuality is false atW1 for the usual reason, and so□Actuality is false atW0.There is a lot more that could be done using the methods of this appendix. For
example, we have not investigated whether Boolean Completeness holds in the mod-
els we have considered, or whether we can modify them to change its status. We
have seen how to secure Rigid Comprehension in type e without ND, but have not
investigated how this works for other types. We hope that others will be able to
make a more systematic exploration.
E Coalesced sums and Maximalist Classicism
This appendix will prove the following theorem, whose significance is explained in
§3.6:
Theorem 3.10. For any set of action models with disjoint base categories, there is
an action model such that every member of that set is among its truncations.
We first introduce an operation for combining an arbitrary set of non-overlapping
rooted categories into a new category, their “coalesced sum”. Intuitively, the co-
alesced sum is the smallest category containing all the objects and arrows of the
input categories, one new objectW0, and one new arrow fromW0 to the base worldof each input category, without making any unnecessary identifications.
Definition. Given a set of rooted disjoint categories ⟨k,Wk⟩ for k ∈ K , their co-
alesced sum, ∇k∈K⟨k,Wk⟩, is the minimal category that includes all the objectsand arrows of each of the k; one new objectW0; and a new distinguished arrow kfromW0 to eachWk such that whenever ℎ◦k = ℎ′◦k, ℎ = ℎ′.88
To prove Theorem 3.10, we define a corresponding operation on sets of action
models.
Definition. Given a set of action models Ak = ⟨k,Wk,−⋅k,k⟩ for k ∈ K (fora given signature) whose underlying categories are disjoint, their coalesced sum
∇k∈KAk is an action premodel ⟨,W0,−⋅,⟩ defined as follows.
• The underlying rooted category ⟨,W0⟩ is ∇k∈K⟨k,Wk⟩, the coalesced sumof the underlying categories of the models Ak.
88This definition does not actually specify the identity of the new object and new arrows, which
can be anything we like. If we want to officially choose, we could require the index set K to be
disjoint from each k, chooseW0 = K , and for each object V of k, chooseHom(W0, V ) to be theset of ordered pairs {⟨W0, ℎ⟩ ∶ ℎ ∈ Hom(Wk, V )}. In this representation the distinguished arrowfromW0 toWk is ⟨W0, 1Wk⟩ rather than just k.
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• For any type , V  = V k for every object V of k, and ℎ = ℎk for everyarrow ℎ of k. (That is: the action of each type on the objects and arrows ofeach Ak is just carried over unchanged into ∇k∈KAk.)
• W e0 is ΠkW ek (the Cartesian product of the type-e domains of theWk).
• When x ∈ W e0 , ke(x) = k(x) (the projection of x onto its k’th co-ordinate).
• W t0 = {X ∈ W  ∣ kX ∈ W tk for each k ∈ K}.
• W →0 = { ∈ W ⇒0 ∣ k⇒ ∈ W →k for all k ∈ K}.
• For a nonlogical constant c of type e, (c) = Πkk(c).
• For a nonlogical constant c of type 1 →⋯→ n→ t, we define (c) by wayof its intension:
c = Int{⟨ℎ◦k, a1,… , an⟩ ∣ ⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩ ∈ Appkc}
Here, Int stands for the operation that turns applicative behaviour profiles inW 1→⋯→n→t
into their corresponding intensions, analogous to the int operation from §3.3, and
App stands for the inverse operation turning intensions back into applicative beha-
viour profiles, analogous to app from from §3.3.89
To show that this is a premodel, we need to check that for a nonlogical constant
c of type , (c) ∈ W 0 . For type e this is immediate. For type  = 1 →⋯→
n → t, we need to show that for all k ∈ K , kc ∈ W k . But this is true: kc =
App k[1×⋯×n]{⟨ℎ◦k, a1,… , an⟩ ∣ ⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩ ∈ Int kc} = App{⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩ ∣
⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩ ∈ Int kc} = App Int kc = kc ∈ W k .Clearly, if∇kAk so defined is an action model (i.e. if its domains are “sufficientlyfull”), then each of the Ak is a truncation of it. So all we need to do to prove thetheorem is verify that the sufficient fullness condition is met: i.e. that for any type-
term A and i ∶ W0 → V , JAKgi exists and is in V  for every type- term A.Any arrow from the base object W0 is either the identity 1W0 or can be writtenuniquely in the form ℎ◦k for some arrow ℎ ∶ Wk → V . In the case of a non-identity arrow ℎ◦k, a straightforward induction on the complexity of terms shows
89For X ∈ W t, IntX = X = AppX. For  ∈ W 1⇒⋯⇒n⇒t
Int  = {⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩ ∣ ⟨1trgℎ, x2,… , xn⟩ ∈ Int ⟨ℎ, x1⟩
AndwhenX is a set of n+1-tuples ⟨ℎ, a1,… , an⟩where for some V , ℎ ∶ W → V and each ai ∈ V i ,
AppX = ⟨ℎ, a1⟩ ↦ App{⟨i, a2,… , an⟩ ∣ ⟨i◦ℎ, i1a1, a2,… , an⟩ ∈ X}.
It is readily shown that these operations are inverses and commute with arrows.
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that JAKgℎ◦k = JAKgk,ℎ for every term A (where J⋅K⋅k,⋅ is the interpretation function of
Ak), and thus in the domain of the target of ℎ. The interesting cases here are those ofthe nonlogical constants, where we need to check that our chosen denotation in the
coalesced sum gets mapped to the constant’s denotation in Ak. When c is of type e,
JcKgℎ◦k = (ℎ◦k)
((c)) = ℎ(k((c))) = ℎ(k((c)) = ℎ(k(c)) = kJcK
g
ℎ. When cis of type other than e, JcKgℎ◦k = (ℎ◦k)((c)) = ℎ(k((c))) = ℎ(k(c)) = JcKgk,ℎ.All the other cases of this induction are trivial.
This leaves us with one more thing to check, namely where i is 1W0 , the identityarrow of the base world. But here everything goes smoothly because we chose the
domains of the base world to be “as full as possible”. Again we need an induction
on the complexity of A.




• For a nonlogical constant c, JcKg1W0 is (c) which we already showed was inthe domain ofW0 as part of showing that the coalesced sum was a premodel.
• For a logical constant A of type → , it suffices to show that k⇒JAKg1W0 ∈
W →k for each k ∈ K . But this is trivial: since the logical constants do thesame thing relative to each arrow in any model the result of acting with k⇒
will just be the interpretation of the same logical constant in Ak and so willautomatically belong toW →k . E.g., for negationwe have that kt⇒tJ¬K1W0 ⟨i,p⟩ =
J¬K1W0 (i◦k,p) = trg(i)
 ⧵ p = J¬Kk,1Wk ⟨i,p⟩, and so kt⇒tJ¬K1W0 = J¬Kk,1Wk ∈
W t→tk .
• For any application AB where A is of type →  and B is of type , suppose
JAKg1W0
∈ W →0 and JBKg1W0 ∈ W









⟩ ∈ W k ; thus JABKg1W0 ∈ W

0 .
• For an abstraction v.A where v is of type  and A is of type , we note that
Jv.AKg1W0
definitely exists by the inductive hypothesis, sowe just need to show
that acting on it with k⇒ gives an element of W →k . But for any i and a,
(k⇒Jv.AKg1W0
)⟨i, a⟩ = Jv.AKg1W0
⟨i◦k, a⟩ = JAK(i◦k◦g)[v↦a]i◦k = JAK
(i◦k◦g)[v↦a]
k,i
(by the induction hypothesis) = Jv.AKk◦gk,1Wk , which is inW
→
k since Ak is an
action model.
This concludes the proof.
We made some unforced choices when we constructed the coalesced sum. Most
obviously, when choosing how to interpret the non-logical constants in the sum, any
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suitable element a such that ka = k(c) for each k would have done. This fixes theextensions of the non-logical predicates relative to every arrow other than 1W0 , butleaves us free to set the extensions relative to 1W0—i.e. the “actual” extensions in themodel—however we please. For concreteness, we gave every nonlogical constant
of a type other than e the empty extension. We also chose a very large domain
for type e at W0, namely the Cartesian product of all of the type-e domains of theinput models. However any set X equipped with functions ke ∶ X → W ek whoseranges include all the interpretations of the type-e non-logical constants in the Wkwould have done. If our language doesn’t have any nonlogical constants of type e,
we could even have X be a singleton, while if it has at least one such constant, we
could choose it to be the set of type-e constants.90
By taking as our input a family of actionmodels for whichClassicism is complete
and building the type-e domains in this alternative way, we will get a model of the
Possibility+ schema discussed in §2. However, the alternative construction still
gives the base world enormous domains in every type other than W0. Indeed, forevery arrow ℎ other than 1W0 ,W t0 contains propositions p ≠ q such that ℎtp = ℎtq:for example, take p to be the set of all arrows from W0, and q to be the set of allarrows other than 1W0 . So with this way of constructing the models, we have theprinciple ∀p(p → □≠p): nothing can be different in any way without some distinctpropositions becoming identical. They are thus as far as can be from being models
of Strong Possibility, which requires that all sorts of things—anything compatible
with Possibility—can happen without any propositions becoming identical. We do
not know whether Strong Possibility is consistent, but any proof of its consistency
using the methods of this section would have to involve a major modification of our
construction that in some sense keeps the domains of W0 as small as possible, sothat there is no need to identify any elements when we follow any arrow into any
model ofMaxC. This seems difficult to pull off.
90If all of the input models are non-logically harmonious, then we could also build a coalesced
sum on a different underlying category which has exactly one arrow from its base objectW0 to everyobject in every input category. The definition of the premodel is just as before. The only thing that
needs to be redone is the proof that c, for a nonlogical constant c of type 1 →⋯→ n → t, does
indeed belong toW 1→⋯→n→t0 (so that the definition is actually an action premodel).
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